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The Lawyer's Dirty Hands
LESLIE GRIFFIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
In his recent book, The Lost Lawyer: FailingIdeals of the Legal Profession,'
Anthony Kronman discusses the moral conflicts faced by lawyers. Lawyers
must protect the interests of their clients, but also must uphold the law's
integrity because they are officers of the court. When these two interests
conflict, the lawyer faces dilemmas that "no simple jurisdictional rule can
solve." 2 Kronman concludes: "Everyone who enters the practice of law
must grapple with this dilemma, just as every politician must confront the
problem of dirty hands.",3 Kronman's conclusion echoes Michael Walzer's
depiction of the politician: "Here is the moral politician: it is by his dirty
hands that we know him. If he were a moral man and nothing else, his hands
would not be dirty; if he were a politician and nothing else, he would
pretend that they were clean." 4
Dirty hands is an inadequate metaphor for professional ethics, for law as
well as politics. A review of dirty hands rhetoric reveals, not only the failures
of the metaphor, but also the fault lines in the content and structure of legal
ethics. In this Article, I explore the problem of dirty hands in the legal
setting. In Walzer's language, I ask if we identify the moral lawyer by her
dirty hands. While dirty hands are indeed pervasive in legal ethics, I
conclude that this is cause, not for celebration, but for cleansing.
Dirty hands has not been a clear metaphor in the literature of legal and
political ethics. There are two leading interpretations of the problem of
dirty hands. In Parts II and III of this Article, I review these two accounts
and identify their limitations. In both interpretations, "[t]he problem of
dirty hands concerns the political leader who for the sake of public purposes
violates moral principles." 5
* Assistant Professor, School of Law, Santa Clara University. B.A. 1978 University of Notre
Dame; M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D. 1984 Yale University; J.D. 1992 Stanford University.
I wrote this article as a Fellow in the Harvard Program in Ethics and the Professions. I am grateful
to Arthur Applbaum, David Estlund, Michael Hardimon, Timothy Lytton, Martha Minow, Christine
Mitchell, and Deborah Stone for their comments and suggestions.
1. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
2. Id. at 145.
3. Id.
4. Michael Walzer, PoliticalAction: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ETHICS
96, 105 (Donald G. Jones ed., 1978) [hereinafter Walzer, Dirty Hands].
5. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, POLITICAL ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE 11 (1987).
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In the first account of dirty hands, when the agent violates moral
principles she acts immorally (although, paradoxically, it is a justifiable
immorality). In Part II, I examine the pervasiveness of this view of dirty
hands in the field of legal ethics, arguing that much of legal ethics presupposes this "immoral" view of the lawyer's role.
Another approach to dirty hands holds that the agent violates moral
principles because she obeys another, more compelling morality, the morality of role. Complexity, therefore, dirties the agent's hands, not immorality.
The second view offers one way to "solve" the problem of dirty hands: it
allows the agent to act morally, not immorally. In Part III, I ask if legal ethics
is a dirty hands field in the second sense - if it is a separate morality.
Although much of legal ethics presupposes a separate view of professional morality, I argue that appealing to a separate morality does not
resolve the problem of dirty hands. The separate ethic is too flawed to justify
overriding common moral principles. I identify three central problems with
the separate ethic. First, the norms of the profession are based in significant
part upon self-interest. Second, the profession fails to enforce its norms of
conduct. Third, the ethical guidelines are too confused to offer adequate
guidance. In legal ethics, separate morality functions as a closed system that
strangles rather than nurtures moral insight.
The analysis of the dirty hands literature, therefore, reveals fundamental
flaws in the structure of legal ethics. Part IV addresses these flaws by
identifying alternative approaches to the problem of dirty hands - ways to
rid the profession of dirty hands. Philosophers and political scientists have
criticized Walzer's account of political dirty hands, and have offered numerous corrections to his description of the politician. In Part IV, I examine
these criticisms and discuss their implications for legal ethics. From philosophy comes the insight that legal ethics should be rooted in principles. From
political science comes the insight that the procedures of legal ethics - the
procedures by which lawyers write as well as enforce the rules of the
profession - must be changed. From both fields comes the conclusion that
legal ethics must be enriched by the participation of outsiders as well as the
addition of external perspectives.
In Part V, I offer one such perspective by examining some traditional
religious accounts of law and ethics. Although philosophy has functioned as
the preferred outside perspective for legal ethics, religion adds its own
perspective. From Jewish and Christian authors emerge strong warnings
against the separate role morality espoused by the legal profession. Moreover, these traditions of moral wisdom provide a content different from the
content of contemporary legal ethics. Religious writers have for centuries
confronted the moral problems that remain central to current legal ethics,
and their moral reasoning deserves the attention of serious students of legal
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ethics, with or without religious predilections. Finally, the reflections of
religious traditions are rooted in the experience of institutions, which
remind us of the dangers of the closed ethic.
I argue that both Jewish and Christian writers support Alan Donagan's
philosophical conclusion that common morality should not be abandoned
when one steps into a professional role.6 The religious traditions remind us
that separate justifications for role moralities may justify too much. Instead,
the examination of the norms of "common morality" is a more fruitful
enterprise for legal ethics than the continued preoccupation with a separate
role morality.
II. THE PROBLEM OF DIRTY HANDS: CAN LAWYERS BE MORAL?
The contemporary discussion of dirty hands commenced with an essay by
Michael Walzer on political ethics.7 Walzer concluded that politicians must
dirty their hands, i.e., violate the moral rules of common humanity, if they
are to govern effectively.8 Walzer based this conclusion on the belief that
political action differs from private sector behavior for the following three
reasons. First, the politician acts not only in the name of others (the citizens
she governs) but also on her own behalf. The tension between these
responsibilities makes political decision-making difficult and complex. Second, politicians are subject to the "pleasures of ruling." 9 Third, politicians
have the potential to enforce their decisions, and the enforcement often
takes the form of physical force.1 °
The paradox of Walzer's theory is his conclusion that politicians must be
prepared to undergo punishment for their moral violations.11 Such punishment guards politicians from breaking moral rules too easily. In addition,
some reluctance, some recognition of involvement in an amoral or immoral
enterprise acts as a psychological or moral barrier to the politician's
conduct. Walzer places this paradox at the heart of the politician's identity:
"Here is the moral politician: it is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he
6. Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS'

ETHICS

123 (David Luban Ed., 1983) [hereinafter Donagan,

JustifyingLegal Practice].
7. Walzer, Dirty Hands, supra note 4, at 96.
8. Id. at 101.
9. Id. at 99.
10. Id. at 100 (stating that: "[T]he victorious politician uses violence and the threat of violence not only against foreign nations in our defense but also against us, and again ostensibly for our
greater good.").
11. Id. at 117. Walzer contends, "[ilt is not the case that when [a politician] does bad in order to
do good he surrenders himself forever to the demon of politics. He commits a determinate crime,
and he must pay a determinate penalty. When he has done so, his hands will be clean again, or as
clean as human hands can ever be." Id.
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were a moral man and nothing else, his hands would not be dirty; if he
were
12
a politician and noting else, he would pretend that they were clean.'
Thus in politics, "[t]he problem of dirty hands concerns the political
leader who for the sake of public purposes violates moral principles." t"In
legal ethics, the problem of dirty hands involves the lawyer who violates
moral principles, although, as we will see, there is some question whether
the violation occurs for public purposes. Much of the relevant literature
suggests that legal ethics is indeed a dirty hands field, involving its practitioners in the violation of moral principles.
A.

THE STANDARD VIEW OF LEGAL ETHICS: DIRTY HANDS

In order to illustrate the claim that legal ethics involves the lawyer in
morally questionable acts, I begin with an example that has by now become
a standard case in legal ethics. The conflicts posed by this problem, and the
law's resolution of them, illuminate the problem of dirty hands for lawyers.
Indeed, the standard case illustrates the so-called standard conception of
the lawyer's role.1 4
The facts of New York v. Belge,' 5 the Lake Pleasant bodies case, are by
now well known. Robert F. Garrow, Sr. was arrested for murder. He told his
attorneys, Frank Belge and Frank Armani, that he had killed two other
girls, and then described the location of their bodies. 6 The attorneys were
not sure if Garrow was telling the truth. They therefore visited the site,
found the bodies, and photographed the scene. t7 One report suggests that
they rearranged the body parts, moving the head of one of the victims closer
to her body, before they took the picture.' 8
12. Id. at 105. Walzer identifies Albert Camus' Just Assassins as representative of his analysis.
The assassins commit their crime, but they are prepared to accept punishment for their actions. An
appropriate punishment thus fits the crime that has taken place. Id. at 117.
Another exemplar of dirty hands is Arthur Harris, a leader of the Bomber Command in England
in the Second World War, who was not honored by his country after the war. Even though Harris'
bombing was essential to the war effort, Walzer thinks Harris should not receive public praise or
recognition: "[a] nation fighting a just war, when it is desperate and survival itself is at risk, must use
unscrupulous or morally ignorant soldiers; and as soon as their usefulness is past, it must disown
them." MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 325 (1977).
13. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 11.
14. For a discussion of the standard conception, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY, app. 1 (1988) [hereinafter LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE] and Ted Schneyer, Moral
Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1529 (1984) [hereinafter
Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception] (examining empirical assumptions made by
moral philosophers who have critiqued lawyers' ethics).
15. 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga Cty. Ct. 1975).
16. Id. at 799.
17. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 53.
18. Bill Jerome, Garrow Case to be Probed by Grand Jury, SYRACUSE HERALD J., July 3, 1974,
reprinted in TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: MATERIALS & PROC. FROM THE NAT'L CONF.
237, 240 (Patrick A. Keenan ed., 1979).
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At no point did the lawyers divulge the location of the bodies.1 9 Beige and
Armani found the bodies in August; the police did not discover the bodies
until months later.2 ° There were some circumstances that caused the
lawyers to consider revealing the bodies' whereabouts. For example, they
offered to disclose the location in return for a favorable plea bargain,21 and
contemplated disclosure at trial as part of an insanity plea.
Outside of limited legal contexts, however, they would not disclose any
information. When the father of one of the girls directly asked one attorney
if he knew anything about the missing daughter, the lawyer did not
answer." The attorney then avoided a meeting with the father of the second
girl because he could not face the father's grief and anguish. 3
I resurrect the Lake Pleasant bodies case in a year of missing girls. The
state of California has been transfixed by the murder of Polly Klaas, who
was kidnapped from her home during a slumber party. 4 In Litchfield, New
York, volunteers have spent many months searching for the missing twelveyear old Sara Anne Wood, the daughter of a local minister.2 ' The public
reaction to these stories conveys some sense of our reaction that few griefs
can rival the taking of a child from her parent. The reaction also conveys
some sense of our common moral wisdom, that there is an obligation to tell
parents of their missing children's whereabouts.
The grief of the parents has always been an aspect of the Lake Pleasant
bodies case, yet in legal ethics it is rarely identified as the central feature of
the story. Instead, the events are usually viewed from the perspective of the
lawyer: the focus is on the professional responsibilities of her role. Beige
and Armani employed such a perspective. The lawyer has a duty to protect
client confidences. 6 If a client has a right not to incriminate himself, he
should not be incriminated by his statements to his lawyers. The bodies
might have contained information that could implicate Garrow in two more
murders, so their location could not be revealed.
The New York state prosecutor brought an indictment against Beige,
alleging that he had violated Public Health Law by failing to report the

19. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 53.
20. Jerome, supra note 18, at 237. The police discovered one body in September and the other in
December. Id.
21. Id. at 241.
22. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 53.
23. David J. Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections to
Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424, 425 (1990) [hereinafter Luban, Some Mid-Course
Corrections].
24. Laura Sessions Step, Missing Children: The Ultimate Nightmare, PARENTS' MAG., Apr. 1994, at
47.
25. Michael Ingrassia, The Trail ofa Serial Killer?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1994, at 60.
26. See, e.g. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1969) (A Lawyer Should

Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
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location of the bodies and by denying them burial.2 ' An attorney is not
allowed to break the law whilekeeping client confidences, and here a law
had been broken. One could construe the unburied bodies as a continuing
crime that is addressed under the rules of legal ethics.28
The Onondaga County Court ruled that the public health statute did not
outweigh the privilege against self-incrimination and dismissed the indictment.2 9 In dicta, the court stated a recurring argument in the ethics
literature: "The effectiveness of counsel is only as great as the confidentiality of its client-attorney relationship., 30 On appeal, the Appellate Division
ruled only on the question of the sufficiency of the indictment, and upheld
the lower court.3 1 Without reaching the question of the attorney-client
privilege, it stated in dicta that it did not view that privilege as absolute.32
The courts dismissed the indictment against the attorneys without ever
reaching the question of the lawyers' responsibility to the parents of the
missing girls. The case's central moral question, then, fell outside the
bounds of the court's technical legal analysis. Armani captured the conflicts
of this situation in an interview given years after the events.

[ Armani ]: This was something that was really momentous for us
because of the conflict within us. Your mind screaming one
way "Relieve these parents!" You know - what is your
responsibility? Should you report this? Shouldn't you report it? One sense of morality wants you to relieve the grief.
[Interviewer]: And the other?
[ Armani ]:The other is your sworn duty.
[Interviewer]: Didn't you think that there was a factor of just common
decency here?
Armani 1:1 can't explain it - but to me it was a question of which was
the higher moral good.
[Interviewer]: Between what?
Armani 1: The question of the Constitution, the question of even a
bastard like him having a proper defense, having adequate
representation, being able to trust his lawyer as to what he
says.
[Interviewer]: Against what?
[ Armani ]:As against the fact that I have a dead girl, the fact that her
27. New York v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 803 (Onondaga Cty. Ct. 1975).
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 7 (noting that an attorney

confronting his client's continuing wrongdoing may reveal the wrongdoing to the extent the
wrongdoing is covered by Rule 1.6 - otherwise, withdrawal from representation may be required)
[hereinafter MODEL RULES).
29. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
30. Id. at 801.
31. People v. Beige, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976).
32. Id. at 377-78.
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body's there. As against the breaking hearts of her parents.
But they are -. It's a terrible thing to play God at that
moment, but in my judgment - and I still feel that way that their suffering is not worth jeopardizing my sworn duty
or my oath of office or the Constitution. 3
Here lurks the image of the lawyer with dirty hands, the lawyer who
overcomes his moral scruples to do what the job requires. Armani's words
capture the conflict at the heart of the problem of dirty hands, the conflict
between common morality and the morality required by a profession. David
Luban, for example, has identified this "fundamental problem of legal
ethics" as whether "the professional role of lawyers impose[s] duties that
are different from, or even in conflict with, common morality." 4 Charles
Fried raises the dirty hands question when he asks if the lawyer can be a
good person, "whether a decent, ethical person can ever be a lawyer. ,35
Dirty hands pervade the literature of legal ethics. They are present,
for example, in Monroe Freedman's provocative ethical analysis of the
lawyer's obligations to the client.3 6 According to Freedman, the American
adversary system of justice entitles - indeed obligates - lawyers to use all
available means to promote the well-being of their clients.3 7 Freedman
originally raised the subject of role morality through an exploration of three
issues:
1. Is it proper to cross-examine for the purpose of discrediting the
reliability or credibility of an adverse witness whom you know to be telling
the truth?
2. Is it proper to put a witness on the stand when you know he will commit
perjury?
3. Is it proper to give your client legal advice when you have reason to
believe that the knowledge you give him will tempt him to commit
8
perjury?

3

33. Ethics on Trial (WETA-TV, video 1987), reprinted in Luban, Some Mid-Course Corrections,
supra note 23, at 425-26.
34. David Luban, Introduction, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 1
(David Luban ed., 1983) [hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER].
35. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 34, at
132, 135.
36. See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal.Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 328 (Michael Davis & Frederick A.

Elliston eds., 1986) [hereinafter Freedman, Criminal Defense Lawyer] (discussing the criminal
defense lawyer's ethical obligations to employ morally suspect tactics on behalf of clients). For a
broad discussion of lawyers' professional duties to preserve the adversary system, see MONROE H.
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS].

37. See generally id.
38. Freedman, CriminalDefense Lawyer, in ETHICS THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 328.
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Freedman's response to all three questions was yes. The system thus allows
the lawyer to cross-examine the truthful witness harshly, or to place a
witness on the stand with advance knowledge that she will commit perjury.
In reaching these conclusions, Freedman relied in part upon the legal
profession's original Canons of ProfessionalEthics, which were adopted by
the American Bar Association in 1908." 9 The 1908 Canons obligated the
lawyer to keep a client's confidences and to devote himself to zealous
representation of the client.' There were limits on such representation:
"the office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for
1
any client, violations of law or any manner of fraud or chicane." 4 Freedman
conceded that the 1908 Canons were "ambiguous," and turned to his
central argument, that the adversary system of justice requires such conduct
of attorneys. 2
Throughout his article, Freedman argues that the needs of the adversary
system regulate the attorney's conduct. The lawyer's role in this system
requires zealous defense of one's clients. The attorney acts in ways that may
appear questionable from outside the system, but which are appropriate
within the adversary system. In the realm of confidentiality, Freedman
argues that the adversary system depends on the client's absolute confidence that her communications will not be betrayed. Otherwise, attorneys
43
would be prevented from acquiring full knowledge of their clients' cases.
Incomplete knowledge, in turn, impairs the attorney's ability to defend her
clients. 4
The requirements of the adversary system, therefore, allow the lawyer to
undertake the actions described in Freedman's three questions. Freedman
has also justified the attorney's attack on the credibility of a rape victim by
making her look promiscuous, despite his knowledge that the accused is
guilty.45 Moreover, Freedman endorsed the conduct of the lawyers in the
Lake Pleasant bodies case in the name of confidentiality.4 6
Freedman does not believe lawyers behave unethically in the performance of these actions, but merely as their role requires. Such tactics are as
justified as pleading the statute of limitations even when the client has
actually wronged the plaintiff. Public policy permits the separate ethic.
39. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908) [hereinafter 1908 CANONS].

40. 1908 CANONS Canon 15 (How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client's Cause).
41. Id.
42. Freedman, CriminalDefense Lawyer, supra note 36, at 328.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 329 (citing 1908 CANONS Canon 15).
45. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 36, at 43-49.
46. Id. at 1-8 (1975). But see John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of
Confidentiality,64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (1966) (asserting "a standard by which to measure the
lawyer's conduct in all situations, absolute confidentiality is inimical to a system which has as its end
rational decision-making.").
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Freedman states: "These policies include the maintenance of an adversary
system, the presumption of innocence, the prosecution's burden to prove
to counsel, and the obligation of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the right 47
confidentiality between lawyer and client."
Freedman raises a point that is central to the dirty hands discussion: he
identifies a separate morality for lawyers, but not an immoral or amoral
choice. Nonetheless, in Freedman's strong conclusion - that the lawyer is
obligated by the adversarial system to undertake conduct that is otherwise
morally questionable - lurks the image of a lawyer with dirty hands.

B.

THE NEW STANDARD VIEW: MORE DIRTY HANDS

Critics of Freedman have rejected his interpretation of the adversary
system. Nonetheless, even these critics finally retain a dirty hands approach
to legal ethics. An important challenge to Freedman's defense of the
adversary system is presented in David Luban's Lawyers and Justice.4 8
Luban's book is a magisterial treatment of the field of legal ethics, attentive
both to philosophical argument and to the demands of legal practice. Much
of his work challenges the separate role morality proposed by Freedman.
Yet, even though Luban questions the lawyer's ethic of dirty hands, he
ultimately accepts them: he explicitly identifies public interest law as a dirty
hands field.4 9 Indeed, Luban's general theory of legal ethics, even though
distinct from Freedman's, is ultimately a theory of dirty hands. Thus, even
this perspicacious critic of Freedman and the adversary system leaves
lawyers with their hands dirty.
In Lawyers and Justice, Luban examines the general subject of role
morality by asking whether a so-called institutional excuse exists: "can a
person appeal to her role in a social institution to excuse herself from
conduct that would be morally culpable were anyone else to do it?"' 50 Luban
focuses on the adversary system excuse, already illustrated by Freedman's
claim that the adversary system justifies otherwise immoral conduct, in
order to ask whether the system justifies a separate role morality for
lawyers.
In order to employ the institutional excuse, Luban states that "the
institution itself must be justified."5 Luban argues that if a role morality is
to be permitted, the institution that demands the role must provide sufficient justification for the practice. In less than felicitous language (as he

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Freedman, CriminalDefense Lawyer, supra note 36, at 337.
LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14.
Id. at 317-40.
Id. at 56.
Id.
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himself admits) Luban refers to this argument as the Fourfold Root of
Sufficient Reasoning.5 2
In the fourfold process, the agent does the following:
(1) justifies the institution by demonstrating its moral goodness;
(2) justifies the role by appealing to the structure of the institution;
(3) justifies the role obligations by showing that they are essential to the
role; and
53
(4) justifies the role act by showing that the obligations require it.
From the conviction that the strength of the institution provides the root of
the moral argument arises Luban's lengthy examination of the American
adversarial system. Luban concludes that the adversary system does not
warrant a separate role morality for lawyers. The adversary system receives
only weak support from pragmatic justifications because "it is no worse than
the plausible alternatives,"5 4 and therefore "is not capable of providing
institutional excuses for acts that would be immoral if they were performed
by someone who was not an incumbent of the institution. 5 5
Thus, the adversary system excuse does not end the moral discussion.
When a conflict arises between role morality and common morality, Luban's
solution is to "balance the demand of a role against the demand of common
morality, giving each some weight." 56 Such an approach cannot give automatic answers to every hard case, but for Luban it avoids the dangers of the
adversary system excuse.
Luban allows a role for "common morality" in the moral calculus of the
lawyer because he recognizes the importance of a "morality of acknowledgment." 5 7 This "morality of acknowledgment" explains Luban's insistence
that professionals must be attentive to common morality as well as to role
morality. Professionals often have to deal with "persons qua persons," and
at these times their roles cannot supply sufficient moral insight. Luban
states:
Our independence from roles derives from the claim of the moral patient,
the person affected by our actions, and not the agent ... At bottom, the
conflict between role morality and the morality of persons qua persons
stems from the fact that acknowledging the other's predicament requires

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

129.
131.
68.
104.
125.
127.
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me to divide my perspective
58
other's point of view.

it requires, that is, thinking from the

If professionals are too entrenched in role moralities, then they will not
respond to the needs of persons.
Despite these cautions against the adversary system excuse and the
limitations of role moralities, Luban does not reject all role moralities. The
reader anticipates a clean hands lawyer, ready to act upon the morality of
acknowledgment. Yet, at that point, Luban reasserts the institutional
excuse, and it becomes clear that the institution determines the moral
conduct of the professional. Luban concludes that criminal law provides a
strong institutional excuse, while civil law does not.5 9 The criminal system,
which protects the individual against the state, can support broad institutional excuses. 6" Yet "[i]n the civil suit paradigm, there is no adversary
system excuse to speak of."' 61 This conclusion illustrates the primacy of the
institutional context in Luban's vision of morality.
This distinction is obvious in Luban's resolution of the Lake Pleasant
bodies case: the critic of the adversary system agrees with Freedman that
the lawyers should not disclose. Armani and Beige were criminal lawyers.
For Luban, the Lake Pleasant bodies case demonstrates that "lawyers may
be required by the duty of confidentiality silently to permit the ruination of
innocent third parties.",62 So much for clean hands.
The uncertainty of Luban's institutional argument appears in his disagreement with Freedman's acceptance of the lawyer's portrayal of a victim in a
rape case as promiscuous, even though he knows the client raped her.6 3 This
is a criminal trial, but Luban argues that in rape cases, it is usually the victim
who is on trial.' In order to promote continued prosecution of rape cases,
and because of the sexism of the system, Luban opposes cross-examination
that makes the victim look promiscuous. But his grounds for doing so are
unclear.
Luban has offered "mid-course corrections" to his book in response to a
6
' These corrections confirm, that, for Luban,
review
by David
the moral analysis. These correcof theWasserman.
institution determines
the quality

58. Id.
59. Id. 149-53.
60. Id. at 148.
61. Id. at 149.
62. Id. at 179.
63. Id. at 150-53.
64. Id. at 150-51 (stating that "It graphically illustrates the literal truth of the cliche that in rape
cases, it is always the victimh who is on trial.").
65. Luban, Some Mid-Course Corrections,supra note 23, at 424 (responding to David Wasserman,
ShouldA Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing?: David Luban on the Morality ofAdversary Representation,
49 MD. L. REV. 392 (1990)).
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tions confirm that despite Luban's objections to Freedman, he embraces a
dirty hands ethic for lawyers.
In the opening pages of the corrective article, Luban replays the Lake
Pleasant bodies case. Here he expresses more ambivalence about the case
than he does in Lawyers and Justice. He notes "the parents' breaking
hearts' 66 and admits that he is "not without qualms ' 67 about his conclusion
not to disclose. 68 Luban then reviews the book's philosophical argument.
He admits, under challenge from Wasserman, that Lawyers and Justice
offers a presumption in favor of the role duty, and not a simple balancing
test between common and role morality. That presumption can be defeated
in extreme circumstances. Luban notes that "[t]he deontological reading
grants a presumption in behalf of doing one's duty - the strength of the
presumption to be determined by the fourfold root inquiry - which
nonetheless may be defeated in exceptional cases.", 69 Luban concedes that
one could accept his theory and still argue that the circumstances of the
Lake Pleasant bodies case constitute an overriding exception. He remarks
that "any moral theory that allows you to answer hard questions confidently
is simple-minded. 70
Luban admits that he equivocates between consequentialist and deontological readings of institutional duty in the book, but opts for a deontological reading in the correction.7 1 He rejects, then, the balancing language of
the book. No longer is there a balance between common morality and role
morality. Rather, "role obligations should be regarded as defeasible presumptions. Treating role obligations as defeasible presumptions implies an
important asymmetry between role morality and common morality, since
role morality becomes in effect the 'default' position, and thus takes
precedence over common morality."7 2
Luban acknowledges that this argument signifies a change from the
66. Luban, Some Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 23, at 426.
67. Id. at 428.
68. Luban is certainly correct that there is no evidence that one overriding of confidentiality will
destroy the adversary system. See id. at 430.
69. Id. at 433.
70. Id. at 433.
71. Id. at 431-35.
72. Id. at 435. But see Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note
34, at 25. Wasserstrom discusses the conflicts that arise when one distinguishes between personal
morality and the role morality of the lawyer in this way. Wasserstrom sketches the "tensions"
inherent in a morality that allows lawyers to perform actions not permitted to those outside the legal
profession, a morality that excuses behavior which would in other situations be immoral. Id. at 25.
Specific problems noted by Wasserstrom are that the lawyer appears to act independently of the
client's moral ends, and that the means the lawyer employs (including cross-examination of a
truthful witness) may be morally suspect. Id. at 27. A universal morality is suspicious of special
circumstances. Wasserstrom also sympathizes with the arguments for role morality: that morality justice - is better served by the role of an attorney in the adversarial system; that all of morality is
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Lawyers and Justice view, in which common morality and role morality were
"equally fundamental." 7 3 Luban now argues that the balancing test in
Lawyers and Justice undermines the integrity of the role, and now accepts
role morality as a defeasible presumption if "justified by the fourfold root
inquiry. '"" Once again, the institution drives the moral analysis. And a
parallel to Walzer's argument emerges: the law is a difficult sphere that
often obligates lawyers to act in violation of common moral principles.
While dirty hands are thus implicit throughout Luban's legal ethics,
Luban himself adopts Walzer's view of dirty hands in his analysis of public
75
interest law. The public interest lawyer is "practicing politics, not law."
Once Luban asserts this definition, he invokes Walzer's dirty hands metaphor for the political arena, and applies it to public interest law. Dirty hands
arise in public interest law because of the conflicts the lawyer faces between
her commitment to reform the legal system and her commitment to the
individual client. Public interest law is morally troubling because legal
reform may require manipulation of clients.
The tension is especially evident in class action suits, in which individual
clients' needs may have to be sacrificed to the needs of the group. Luban
admits that the lawyer is a double agent in these cases: "[T]he lawyer is an
agent for both the client and the cause"7 6 and faces "the kind of dirty hands
dilemma that arises when fidelity to our cause requires cheating against 'our
own people.'
The traditional lawyer's ethic of zealous devotion to the client, with its
opposition to client manipulation, may be inconsistent with the public
interest goal of legal reform. Luban refers to those who criticize public
interest law from the perspective of traditional legal ethics as proponents of
the "client control objection., 78 Luban challenges their ethic, suggesting
that the objection is put forward by those resistant to social change.79 Once
role-bound; and that peoples' agreements and expectations are fostered and protected within roles.
Id. at 30.
Wasserstrom's primary concern is to identify the appeal of each side of the argument. Nonetheless, he concludes that role-differentiated moralities bear the burden of proof, but are not
prohibited. Id. at 36-37. He states, "[t]he stronger the character of the role differentiation, the
stronger the argument in its favor must be if the presumption is to be overcome." Id. at 37.
Wasserstrom thus demands more justification for the separate role morality than Luban.
For a different criticism of Luban's role morality, which emphasizes an individual, "fideist"
account of morality, see Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV.
853, 883 (1992).
73. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 443.
74. Id. at 451.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 293.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 356.
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again, for Luban the resolution of the ethical problem lies in the fourfold
root with its focus on the institution. A sufficiently weighty cause may give
the public interest lawyer reason to manipulate her individual client's
well-being. The more just the cause, the better the excuse to manipulate the
client.
The political nature of the institution of public interest law allows such
conduct. In Luban's vision of political action, the reformers share a primary
commitment to the cause, and a derivative mutual commitment to one
another. In such circumstances, the individual in the public interest case
may be subject to the needs, or even the vote, of the group.
Luban tries to limit this manipulation. For example, he asserts that
"manipulation of a client on behalf of the cause is tolerable when and only
when the conditions of mutual political commitment (freedom, reciprocity,
and equality) are met." 80 Because one is manipulating the individual in the
name of the group, the agent must be clear about the general will of the
group. Luban contends that "the existence of a dirty-hands dilemma
suggests that the lawyer should put the matter to the group as a whole (or to
representative members of the group): a political decision should be made
by political processes." 8 1
Luban summarizes these limitations on dirty hands conduct by concluding
such action is excusable, "forgivable" states the matter more carefully, if
(1) the clients are also committed to the cause;
(2) the outcome of the manipulation represents the will of the political
group;
(3) the82 manipulative behavior is not itself abhorrent to the political
group.
Nonetheless, these limitations cannot convincingly overcome the inherent
tension public interest lawyers face when individual client interests conflict
with broader goals of legal reform. 83 In this sphere, agents face an "intractable moral problem." 84 Thus, public interest law is a sphere of dirty hands.
Despite his disagreements with Freedman over the range of the adversary
system excuse, therefore, Luban ultimately accepts the possibility of rolebased moralities when an institution is sufficiently strong to support them.
Dirtier tactics are allowed in criminal and in public interest law, given the
needs of these institutions. Thus, in Luban, as in Freedman, as in the Lake
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

337.
339.
340.
336.
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Pleasant bodies case, the profession obligates its members to questionable
moral conduct, which violates common moral principles. While he does so
reluctantly, Luban gives the professional role the automatic preference
over common moral principles.
Charles Fried raises the dirty hands question when he asks if the lawyer
can be a good person, "whether a decent, morally sensitive person" can ever
be a lawyer. 85 He has drawn an analogy between the lawyer and the friend.
In my opinion, Fried's analogy has become the Rorschach test for contemporary legal ethics. This analogy suggests a common morality approach,
because both lawyers and friends should act under common moral principles. Moreover, Fried's essay implicitly criticizes Luban's account of
public interest dirty hands. Although Fried's article antedates Luban's
book, his argument counters Luban's resistance to the client control objection. Fried argues that: "[T]he concept of legal friendship was introduced to
answer the argument that the lawyer is morally reprehensible
to the extent
86
that he lavishes undue concern on some particular person.,
Fried, however, does not completely escape the problem of dirty hands.
For Fried, the hardest question occurs when the lawyer is asked to do
something personally dishonorable but not outlawed by the law or the
ethical rules. This borderline area includes conduct that the lawyer finds
morally repugnant. Moreover, such conduct may bring harm to a specific
person. According to Fried, it is not enough to say that one may decline such
a morally repugnant case; the important question is "whether one is morally
bound to refuse - bound to refuse even if he is the last lawyer in town and
no one else will bail him out of his moral conundrum.,87
In order to solve this problem, Fried's solution is for lawyers to distinguish "between wrongs that a reasonably just legal system permits to be
worked by its rules and wrongs which the lawyer personally commits. 8 8 For
example, asserting the statute of limitations or lack of a written memorandum is not a personal action; "it is a formal, legally-defined act."8 9 But
humiliating a witness or lying to a judge is a personal act. Thus the legal
system insulates the lawyer's moral responsibility in the former cases, but
not in the latter. Fried maintains there is a difference "between the lawyer's
own wrong and the wrong of the system used to advantage by the client."9
While Fried's solution is intriguing, its underlying principles are unclear.
Fried does not expect this solution to resolve every borderline case. But it
looks again as if the institution will justify questionable conduct. Thus Fried
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Fried, supra note 35, at 135.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.

HeinOnline -- 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 233 1994-1995

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 8:219

and Luban hint of approaches to legal ethics that circumvent the violation
of moral principles. In the end, however, they succumb to dirty hands.
III. LEGAL ETHICS: A CLOSED SYSTEM
Dirty hands has not been a clear metaphor in the literature of political
ethics. My discussion of Freedman's and Luban's analyses of legal ethics
suggests the difficulty of the metaphor. One vision of dirty hands is that, in
violating common morality, the agent acts immorally, although, paradoxically, the immorality is justifiable. This is Walzer's view. Luban suggests
such an approach in public interest law.
Another vision holds that the agent violates moral principles because she
obeys another, more compelling, morality-the morality of role. Thus
complexity, not immorality, makes the agent's hands dirty. Freedman's
adversary ethic supports this reading, as does Luban's institutional excuse.
Hence, actions endorsed by Freedman and Luban, including the failure to
disclose the location of the Lake Pleasant bodies, are not immoral, but
moral in a different sense.
Walzer's description of political ethics supports the former view: the
politician acts immorally. Much of the literature of legal ethics presupposes
the second view of dirty hands: lawyers act according to a separate morality.
Such a view is accepted by, for example, Anthony Kronman, when he
employs the language of dirty hands.9 1 Luban and Freedman at times
defend the latter view. The second view is attractive because it offers one
way to "solve" the problem of dirty hands: it allows the agent to act morally,
not immorally.
In this section I ask if legal ethics is a dirty hands field in the second sense,
that is, if it is a separate morality. Although many proponents of legal ethics
suggest that it is, I argue that appeals to a separate morality cannot
eliminate the problem of dirty hands. The legal ethic is too flawed to
provide sufficient justification for a separate morality. The most serious flaw
is that the norms of legal ethics arise in significant part from self-interest. In
addition, even if the separate morality were adequate, it is subject to serious
deficiencies in enforcement. These failures of enforcement undermine the
justification for a separate ethic.
A.

AN ETHIC OF SELF-INTEREST

Legal ethics is a closed system, circumscribed in its sources, application
and enforcement. Wherever one roams in the field, one encounters lawyers.
91. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 101-06 (observing that the ideal statesman is peculiarly well
equipped to confront unavoidable political ruthlessness).
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Lawyers write the rules; lawyers interpret the rules; lawyers enforce the
rules. In this country, it is difficult to identify a more closed professional
ethic. Although much has been written about a medical fraternity unwilling
to challenge its own members, doctors must face lawyers and judges when
they make mistakes. Christian clergy, who also live within closed professional systems, are held accountable to members of a different profession in
courts of law when they overstep certain boundaries.
The fundamental sources of legal ethics are profession-specific documents. The profession obligates its members to obey standard codes, canons
or rules. Lawyers take multiple-choice tests on these rules when they enter
the profession. The rules are written by lawyers under the assumption that
lawyers best understand the moral requirements of the practice of law. The
original American legal ethical standards were canons, written by lawyers to
guide the conduct of their group. The American Bar Association's 1908
Canons governed the profession for many years, from 1908 to 1969. Then
the profession replaced the Canons with the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code).92 The Model Code lasted a much shorter time,
and was eventually replaced, or at least supplemented, by the Model Rules of
ProfessionalResponsibility (Model Rules)."
The changes in codes and rules reflect changes in the perspective of
lawyers.9 4 The Canons were drafted by the bar.9 5 The Model Code was also
drafted by lawyers only: "No outsiders were invited to participate or review
drafts; no interim drafts were published or circulated; no hearings were
held.",9 6 In contrast, Geoffrey Hazard reports that the Kutak Commission,
which prepared the Model Rules, was very different and resembled "public
lawmaking."9 7 This commission held public hearings and distributed drafts
of proposed rules. Yet, even this controversial commission, whose proposed
reforms prompted great opposition from the American Bar Association,
was composed primarily of lawyers. After some discussion, two nonlawyers, Lois Harrison, of the League of Women Voters, and Washington
Post editor Alan Barth, were added to the group.99 Barth was not replaced
92.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1969).

93. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. States vary in
their adoption of the MODEL RULES or the MODEL CODE.

94. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L. J. 1239 (1991)
[hereinafter Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics] (remarking that the change from the original
Canons to the Model Code was a bigger shift than the move from the Model Code to the Model Rules,
although the latter inspired comparatively greater uproar).
95. Id. at 1250-51.
96. Id. at 1253.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Theodore Schneyer, Professionalismas Politics:The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics Code, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 95, 108 (Robert Nelson et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Schneyer, Professionalismas Politics].
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when he died in 1979.1"' Theodore Schneyer identifies Harrison's contribution as the requirement that lawyers put their fee agreements into writing.'' Reaction from non-lawyers was sought in public hearings on the
drafts of the Rules, but the meetings were sparsely attended. 10 2 Schneyer
observes: "Not only did the public members of the commission prove
inconsequential, but lay groups completely ignored the series of public
hearings the commission held in 1980."1°3 Public opinion was important in
one sense, but one that had nothing to do with the merits of the ethical
content of the Model Rules. Public opinion really meant good public
relations, which became important to the legal profession in the wake of the
Watergate scandal.1 °4
Thus lawyers' ethics are promulgated by lawyers. Then the rules are
enforced against lawyers by other lawyers, by bar associations, or by judges
in a court of law. Even attempts at outside regulation do not always escape
the perspective of lawyers. In securities and banking law, for example,
legislation may implicate the lawyer's ethics, but the interpretation of the
lawyer's duty often reverts to the courts. Thus lawyers' ethical duties
continue to be defined by lawyers.
For example, in Schatz v. Rosenberg,10 5 Ivan and Joanne Schatz sued the
law firm of Weinberg & Green (Weinberg) for violations of securities law,
as well as common law misrepresentation."0 6 Weinberg represented Mark
Rosenberg and his MER Enterprises in dealings with the Schatzes. Rosen°7
berg purchased an 80% interest in two companies owned by the Schatzes.'
Rosenberg gave them promissory notes for $1.4 million and the Schatzes
provided a bridge loan of $150,000 to Rosenberg.' 0 8 The notes were
worthless.10 9 The Schatzes relied on a financial statement and an update
letter, prepared by Weinberg, which overvalued Rosenberg's assets and
contained other misrepresentations.11 0
The ethical question focuses on Weinberg's responsibility to the
Schatzes. 11' As with the Lake Pleasant bodies case, responsibility is linked
to the issue of disclosure. The Fourth Circuit ruled that Weinberg had no
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 109.
103. Id. See also Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV.

639, 667 (1981) (noting that "the principal symbolic function of rules of professional conduct,
clearly, is legitimation.").
104. Schneyer, Professionalismas Politics, supra note 99, at 109.
105. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
106. Id. at 487.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 488.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The Meaning of the
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duty to disclose Rosenberg's misrepresentation to the Schatzes. n 2 The
sources cited in the ruling illustrate the range of the court's approach to
legal ethics. The court searched in vain for a duty to disclose in Maryland's
legal ethics rules, Maryland common law, federal securities law, and public
policy. The Maryland Rules of Professional Responsibility - and in particular, an ethics ruling from the State Bar Ethics Committee - were rejected
as sources of a duty to disclose because the court reasoned that ethical
codes for lawyers regulate the profession, but do not serve as legal standards
of liability, and cannot provide a legal duty to disclose.113
Maryland common law also failed to impose a duty on Weinberg, for in
Maryland a lawyer owes a duty only to clients or to third party beneficiaries
of the lawyer's legal opinion." 4 Weinberg had not issued any legal opinions,
only an update letter. 1 5
A duty to disclose was not found in federal securities law.116 The Schatzes
alleged violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934117
and aiding and abetting under the securities laws. 1 They charged that
Weinberg committed fraud by: (1) failing to disclose (silence) Rosenberg's
misrepresentations as well as (2) making "affirmative misstatements" about
Rosenberg's assets.1 9 Weinberg prepared the financial update letter for
MER, as well as the closing documents which contained the misrepresentations. Weinberg argued, however, that he merely forwarded Rosenberg's
1 20
own statements to the Schatzes.

The court agreed with Weinberg and ruled that non-disclosure of Rosenberg's troubles did not violate section 10(b) because there is no liability for
silence, absent a duty to disclose. 121 Under federal securities law, a duty of
disclosure arises from a fiduciary - or similar - relationship between the
Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395 (1993) [hereinafter Hazard, Lawyer Liability in Third Party
Situations] (discussing attorneys' liability to third parties with respect to the savings and loan crisis).
112. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 498.
113. Id. at 492. The court held: "The rationale for these rulings is clear. The ethical rules were
intended by their drafters to regulate the conduct of the profession, not to create actionable duties
in favor of third parties." Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 488. See also Fortson v. Winstead, 961 F.2d 469, 472 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that "a
failure to disclose material information constitutes securities fraud only upon proof of a duty to
disclose"). Citing Schatz, the court held that federal securities laws cannot be the source of that
duty. Id.
116. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 492.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1988).
118. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 489.
119. Id.
120. Id. Note that the plaintiffs alleged that Weinberg & Green "knew that its client, Rosenberg,
was financially insolvent." Id. The court's conclusion as to whether Weinberg possessed this
knowledge is unclear.
121. In Schatz, the court identified the following elements of a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
violation: "[Tihe defendant (1) made an untrue statement of material fact or omitted a material fact
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parties, a relationship not present between lawyers and non-clients. A
confidential or fiduciary relationship would have to be present between
lawyer and non-client for a duty to disclose to arise. 122 This standard would
a signed opinion, such as a tax opinion, written for a third
have required
123
party.
The court also rejected a public policy argument favoring lawyer disclosure of such information, because it feared that recognition of a general
124 Cliduty to disclose would undermine the attorney-client relationship.
ents might restrict their communications with their attorneys and thus
hamper attorneys' search for knowledge about their clients' undertakings.
The presence of this argument in the opinion is unsurprising. Whenever
there is a discussion of a duty to disclose, lawyers - and judges - retreat to
the argument that disclosure will ruin the attorney-client relationship.
None of the legal or ethical sources, even statutes whose original purpose
was to protect investors, included any obligation to third parties. Moreover,
interpretation of statutes that identify a duty to disclose is left to lawyers.
Canons, codes or rules of ethics, statutes, and statutory interpretations: the
court confronts an array of ethical sources, but not a very broad array. Even
when it reaches beyond the ethical rules, the ethical range is narrow.
A closed ethical system is not per se unethical, nor does it automatically
lead to dirty hands. But it is fraught with dangers. Reinhold Niebuhr
warned that individuals working within groups are confronted by collective
5
egoism and so pursue their own interests at the expense of others.12 Legal
ethics is subject to this temptation of self-interest, and so provides an
illustration of an "immoral society."
Many commentators have identified the predominance of self-interest in

that rendered the statements misleading, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,
(3) with scienter, and (4) which caused plaintiff's losses." Id.
122. The court cited the test employed inAbell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988),
vacated on othergrounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989), that lawyers can be liable to third parties "only if the
non-client plaintiff can prove that the attorney prepared specific legal documents that represent
explicitly the legal opinion of the attorney preparing them, for the benefit of the plaintiff." Id. at 491.
123. But see Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing between
silence and a material lie, arguing that even without a duty to disclose, a material lie is prohibited
under section 10(b) and explaining that "[u]nder Rule 10b-5, moreover, the lack of an independent
duty does not excuse a material lie.").
124. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 493.
125. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932). Niebuhr appears to be the
favorite theologian of those who accuse the profession of self-interest. See, e.g., Timothy W. Floyd,
Realism, Responsibility and the Good Lawyer: Niebuhrian Perspectives on Legal Ethics, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 587 (1992) (applying Niebuhr's ethic of responsibility to issues raised by client
loyalty); Amy R. Mashburn, Pragmatismand Paradox:Reinhold Niebuhr's CriticalSocial Ethic and the
Regulation of Lawyers, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 737 (1993) (analyzing the Model Code based on
Niebuhrian theory and methodology).
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legal ethics. 126 The most striking example involves confidentiality. Confidentiality is a central tenet of the legal profession, present in its ethical codes, as
well as its ideology and ethos. 12 7 Lawyers justify their commitment to
confidentiality based on their fidelity to clients.12 Keeping confidences both
protects the client's interests, and upholds the adversary system. If clients
think their confidences will be betrayed, they will not fully communicate
with their lawyers. As a result, their cases will not be represented most
effectively. It was this ethos that Frank Armani imbibed in law school, and
for which Monroe Freedman provides intellectual underpinning.129
The ideology of confidentiality explains why the legal profession has
found it difficult to identify any exceptions to an absolute norm of confidentiality. 3 ° It also explains lawyers' fervent conviction that any exception, no
matter how limited, will lead to the demise of the adversarial system.'
126. See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.
243,256 [hereinafter Gillers, What We Talked About] (observing that the lawyer's duty of confidentiality yield when the lawyer's interests are in peril). See also Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA
Bothers: A FunctionalPerspective on ProfessionalCodes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981) (noting that the
bar's commitment to advancing public ends is superficial).
127. See Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 94, at 1242 (identifying the ethos of the
profession as the fearless lawyer championing the oppressed, bound by loyalty, confidentiality and
candor to the court); Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Barand the State, 70 N.C.L. REV. 1389,
1427 (1992) [hereinafter Koniak, Bar and State] (noting that although codes of ethics mask the
centrality of confidentiality to the bar, ethics opinions indicate that commitment to confidentiality
unifies the bar in its war against the state).
128. Koniak, Bar and State, supra note 127, at 1456 ("For the bar, the moral of its narratives is
duty to client first.").
129. See supra part II.A-B (describing the standard and contemporary view of dirty hands).
130. The Model Code permits, but does not require, disclosure of "[t]he intention of his client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." MODEL CODE DR 4-101
(1980). It also allows disclosure of "[clonfidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect [the
lawyer's] fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct." Id.
The Model Rules allow, but do not require, disclosure "to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(1). Disclosure is allowed "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond
to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client." MODEL
RULES Rule 1.6 (b)(2). The Commentary to the Model Rules states that "[a] lawyer's decision not to
take preventive action" on the criminal act does not violate the Rule. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt.
The Kutak Commission proposed, but did not pass, a provision that allowed disclosure "to prevent
the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely
to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another" as well as "to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act
in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used." COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS'N, REVISED FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6 (June 1982). See Deborah H. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal

Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985) [hereinafter Rhode, Ethical Perspectives] (summarizing the
debate on confidentiality at the Kutak Commission as an illustration of the legal ethics system).
131. This belief that the legal system will disintegrate with any violation of confidentiality
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Commitment to client protection may explain why lawyers needed to debate
the most obvious exception to confidentiality, which permits disclosure of
client confidences to prevent future bodily harm to a third party. It may also
explain lawyers' reluctance to admit an exception to confidentiality for
disclosure of fraud in financial transactions. 13 2 It may even explain the Lake
Pleasant bodies case.
However, it cannot explain the exceptions to client confidentiality that
appear unexceptionable to lawyers. Lawyers quickly abandon absolute
confidentiality when their fees are at stake or when the quality of their
representation is challenged. 133 As Stephen Gillers has stated: "Though the
confidentiality duty does not yield in the face of injustice to others, it
dissolves if there is peril to the professional or financial interests of the
lawyer." 13' 4 Gillers captures the flavor of a professional ethic based on
self-interest:
The lawyers who approved the Rules [of Professional Conduct] looked
after their own. They have given us an astonishingly parochial, selfaggrandizing document, which favors lawyers over clients, other persons,
and the administration of justice in almost every line, paragraph, and
permits significant choice. It is internally inconsistent to the
provision that135
bar's benefit.

If self-interest is the guiding force behind professional canons, then lawyers'
hands will be dirty when they follow their separate ethic.
B.

AN ETHIC WITHOUT ENFORCEMENT

Inadequacy of enforcement exacerbates problems of self-interest in the
pervades the literature. But see William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1083, 1142 (1988) [hereinafter Simon, Ethical Discretion] ("[t]he argument's empirical
premises are unverifiable and not powerful intuitively"); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989) (noting that lawyers often ignore empirical studies of confidentiality,
but that such studies confirm the problems with absolute confidentiality).
132. See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, The Office of Thrift
Supervision, and the Pursuitof the Dollar, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 985, 999 n.57 (1993) for a summary of
this discussion. The original rule required attorneys to reveal client fraud, but in 1974 it was
qualified by the addition of "except when the information is protected as a privileged communication." Id. Model Rule 1.6 allowed revelation of fraud against a third party, but now the rule forbids
disclosure. Instead, the lawyer may withdraw from the case. Id. See also Koniak, Bar & State, supra
note 127, at 1431-47 (discussing the importance of confidentiality to the bar). For an overview of
problems in the legal profession with confidentiality, see Rhode, EthicalPerspectives,supra note 130.
133. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(2) (providing exceptions to the confidentiality rule when the
lawyer's conduct is in dispute).
134. Gillers, Wat We Talked About, supra note 126, at 256. See also Rhode, Ethical Perspectives,
supra note 130, at 590 (noting "insular" quality of the bar's interest in legal ethics).
135. Gillers, What We Talked About, supra note 126, at 245. See also Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer
Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 711 (1981) (stating that "[t]his
self-protective attitude of the profession ... is in reality the central, and so far, intractable puzzle of
professional discipline.").
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content of legal ethics. Even if one concedes, arguendo, that lawyers can
devise for themselves appropriate rules of conduct, failures of enforcement
call the ethic into question. Lawyers share with other professionals an
unwillingness to discipline members of their own group. The problem is
compounded by the fact that courts of law are the last resort for enforcement.' 36
The dangers of enforcement in a closed ethical system are evident in the
history of Rule 11 sanctions. 137 Rule 11 was passed as an attempt to guide
the conduct of lawyers. Under Rule 11, sanctions can be sought against a
lawyer who files frivolous lawsuits, or who uses frivolous arguments in a
lawsuit. 138 The rule states:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
139
of litigation.
What appears as an unobjectionable ethical rule has not worked so well in
practice. Rule 11 has been used by lawyers as a weapon against other
lawyers, especially against civil rights plaintiffs or lawyers for the poor. 4 °
The rule against frivolity can become a tool of harassment.
Moreover, the courts have failed to enforce Rule 11 in a meaningful
manner. In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,"' the Supreme Court established an abuse of discretion standard for review of Rule 11 sanctions.' 4 2
That standard is virtually meaningless; it provides little guidance to lower
courts as to what circumstances really warrant sanctions.' 4 3 Thus, little
consistency has emerged in the circuit courts over the appropriate use of
Rule 11 sanctions. Given the uncertainty in interpretation and enforcement

136. Martyn, supra note 135, at 707 (stating that "[u]nlike other professionals, who are supervised
by state regulatory agencies, lawyers remain a virtually self-regulated profession.").
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 838-40
(1992) [hereinafter Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?] (noting that certain kinds of plaintiffs
are particularly likely to be sanctioned under Rule 11).
141. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
142. Id. at 405.
143. For a critique of the standard developed in Cooter& Gell, see Marjorie Carol Turk, Cooter&
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.: Federal Rule 11 Sanctions and the Inequitable Application of the Abuse of
Discretion Standardof Review, 25 Lov. L. REV. 555 (1992).
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of this Rule, it is difficult to see how it functions as a meaningful, practical
standard for lawyers.
Susan Koniak has described the numerous enforcement problems of legal
ethics.1 44 The standard view of legal ethics, asserts Koniak, is that attorneys
should do everything possible for their clients without violating the law.14 5
From the perspective of the problem of dirty hands, this restriction-that
attorneys not violate the law in service of their clients - appears to provide
an important restraint on the conduct of attorneys.
One could argue that this limitation justifies the separate ethic for
lawyers; under this standard, lawyers are as accountable as any other parties
for their violations of the law. Koniak, however, has demonstrated that this
standard does not work in practice.1 46 What counts as a violation
of the law
14 7
is often unclear, and the standard is uncertain in content.
Instead, lawyers engage in a constant battle to define the content of the
law. Two visions of legal ethics are thus at war. The bar seeks to impose one
view, while the state seeks to impose another. The state and the bar thus
contest one another for control of the profession. Koniak claims that "[t]he
state acts weak and speaks weak., 1 48 But the bar is a strong actor, constantly
asserting its own interests. When the state acts against the bar's selfinterest, the bar fights back.14 9 For example, the bar tries to overcome state
rulings on ethics when it disagrees with them.1 50 The problem does not end
with division between the state and the bar. Instead, the courts - whose
task is to resolve disputes - do not mediate the conflict. The next layer of
lawyers does not enforce legal ethics. Judges have been reluctant to enter
the fray, and courts have "refuse[d] to frame the law., 1 51 Koniak asserts
that: "[J]udges are particularly unlikely to assert their interpretive power or
back their interpretations with violence in cases in which their understanding of law diverges from the bar's."' 5 2
Koniak's writings demonstrate how an ethic of self-interest, combined
144. Koniak, Bar and State, supra note 127.
145. Id. at 1395-96.
146. Id. at 1398.
147. See generally Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame It to
Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1101 (1993) [hereinafter Koniak, When Courts Refuse]. Koniak
contends that: "When confronted with court law contrary to bar law, the bar often takes the position
that a lawyer may ethically comply with the court but is not required to do so." Id.
148. Koniak, Bar and State, supra note 127, at 1391.
149. Koniak, When Courts Refuse, supra note 147, at 1101.
150. Koniak, Bar and State, supra note 127, at 1411. (noting that the bar presumes ethics rules
control when they conflict with other law, whereas the state presumes that its laws control when they
conflict with ethics rules).
151. Id.
152. Koniak, When Courts Refuse, supra note 147, at 1079. See also Hazard, The Future of Legal
Ethics, supra note 94, at 1260 (asserting that the distance between the courts and the legal profession
continues to grow).
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with poor enforcement, provides a questionable morality for practicing
lawyers. Her examination of securities law illustrates the problem. In the
1970's, the SEC sought a disclosure of fraud standard for lawyers in practice
before the Commission. The bar vigorously opposed the standard, "[t]he
courts ducked," ' 53 and the issue was left unresolved.
The issue reappears in recent discussions of securities and banking law,
and in the savings and loan scandal. Defenders of lawyers' conduct in the
savings and loan crisis support the separate ethic of the lawyer, who protects
client interests, without disclosing confidences. Under this view, disclosure
of fraud violates ethics. Koniak is more critical of the bar; she argues that
the legal profession invited the wrath of enforcers by refusing to provide
and enforce meaningful ethical standards within the profession. She states
that:
One must judge a private group's legal vision based on the acts it justifies.
In the case of the bar, we must consider the acts of lawyers that the bar's
law justifies. By this standard, I believe the state's vision is better than the
bar's. Too many lawyers seem to live a law that functions as a justification
for aiding clients' fraudulent schemes. A law that suggests that O.P.M.'s
lawyers 154
[who did not disclose financial fraud] did the right thing demands
reform.
Koniak's criticisms of legal ethics can be read to offer another criticism of
the separate ethic for the lawyer. Such a reading sympathizes with the
profession's claims that legal practice confronts lawyers with difficult challenges, which they alone can understand. On this reading of legal ethics, the
professional ethic ultimately fails because it does not provide lawyers with
any clear code of behavior. The ethic is so muddled that it lacks sufficient
status to justify a separate morality.1 55
153. Koniak, When Courts Refuse, supra note 147, at 1079. Koniak suggests the court ducked in
SEC v. Nat'l Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), when it held that an attorney
who knew of inaccurate financial statements was liable for failing to disclose them before merger. Id.
See also Koniak, Barand State, supra note 127, at 1465 (arguing that the court in SEC v. Nat'l Student
Marketing Corp. conceded "its role as authoritative interpreter simultaneously to the bar and the
SEC.").
154. Koniak, When Courts Refuse, supra note 147, at 1109-10. In the O.P.M. case, the attorneys
found out from the clients that financial statements were misleading. The client kept assuring the
lawyers that no fraud was being committed. The law firm, Singer Hutner, eventually withdrew from
the case, knowing that $80-90 million worth of fraudulent loans were outstanding. The new law firm
continued to close fraudulent deals. Id. at 1096-97 (citing In re O.P.M Leasing Servs., 28 B.R. 740
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
155. See Abel, supra note 103, at 642. Abel contends that:
In order for rules to mold behavior they must set forth the boundaries of that behavior with
clarity; the vaguer they are, the less effect they can have (or at least the less predictable that
effect will be). Yet the Model Rules are drafted with an amorphousness and ambiguity that
render them virtually meaningless.
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The Kaye Scholer case, in which lawyers debated what standard applies
to them as they practice law in a regulated industry, illustrates this difficulty.
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) filed a $275 million action against
the law firm Kaye Scholer, alleging violations of thrift regulations in Kaye
Scholer's representation of Lincoln Savings and Loan (Lincoln).1 56 Kaye
Scholer had represented Lincoln before the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. The FDIC eventually took over Lincoln, and declared its insolvency. 15 7 The OTS accused Kay Scholer of hiding Lincoln's insolvency from
federal regulators. Kaye Scholer eventually settled the suit for $41 million.158
Disclosure was the central issue in the case. The OTS charged that Kaye
Scholer "knowingly misrepresented" Lincoln's status, and also "failed to
disclose" the resignation of the accountants, the improper inflation of
assets, and numerous adverse documents that were relevant to Lincoln's
solvency.15 9 Kaye Scholer's immediate defense was that the charges were an
"attempt by the OTS to create and apply new standards for attorney
conduct that are different from, and inconsistent with, generally accepted
professional standards and ethical obligations for lawyers representing a
160
client."
The discussion of the ethical issues surrounding Kaye Scholer illustrates
the conflict and confusion within the profession over the meaning of
lawyers' ethical standards. Harris Weinstein, the former Chief Counsel of
the OTS, has examined the Kaye Scholer case in light of professional ethical
standards and statutory authority. 1 6 1 Weinstein argues that the charges
against Kaye Scholer should be read in connection with the requirements of
banking practice. 162 He posits that the law firm's duty arose from an OTS
regulation 163 which prohibits false statements and material omissions. If the
law prohibits the client from such deception, then the attorney is also so
prohibited, argues Weinstein.1 64 On the issue of confidentiality, Weinstein
concludes that "the best way to maximize the degree of client compliance
with the law is to preserve confidences but also to make clear, both within
156. The chronology of these events is spelled out in Forum, Introduction: Kaye, Scholer and the
OTS -Did Anyone Go Too Far?,66 S.CAL. L. REV. 977 (1993).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 981-82.
160. Id. at 982-83 (quoting Memorandum from Kaye, Scholer Executive Committee to All Kaye,
Scholer Personnel 1 (Mar. 2, 1992)).
161. Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 53
(1993).
162. Id. at 62.
163. 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b) (1992). Weinstein notes the parallels between these regulations and
Rule 10-b(5) of securities law. Weinstein, supra note 161, at 56.
164. Weinstein, supra note 161, at 56.
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the profession and to clients and the society at large, that a lawyer may have
no role in assisting unlawful conduct.' ' 165 Furthermore, "[tihe [attorneyclient] privilege protects silence, not deceit.' ' 166 Thus legal as well as ethical
obligations would obligate disclosure by attorneys who knew of Lincoln's
condition.
Yet there is great fear within the profession that the regulators have gone
too far, and that their actions threaten the profession (and finally the
client). In these discussions, the relationship between the law and ethics is
disputed. Some fear that "regulators have begun to take over from the bar
enforcement of ethical rules governing legal practice." 161 Moreover, this
enforcement is not consistent with the traditional view of the lawyer's role.
As one commentator noted, "OTS' approach was an attempt to use these
ethical directives to impose arguably new fiduciary obligations and liabilities
on lawyers.' 68 Lawyers who criticize the OTS argue that the bar should be
able to. police itself through disbarment and other regulations, not by
external 0 fines or penalties. 169 "[Sitatutes are the easiest enforcement
17
tools.
The discussion does not end with a conclusion that regulators should use
statutes rather than ethical standards for enforcement. The statutes themselves are challenged.' 7 1 One commentator has argued that both the
Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Act (FIRREA) and the Securities Enforcement Remedies Act revolutionize lawyers' ethics by turning
lawyers into "watchdogs" or "gatekeepers.' 72 Such a role undermines
client confidentiality, and so limits the lawyer's role.17 3 Under this statutory
165. Id. at 64.
166. Id. at 61.
167. See Curtis, supra note 132, at 986 (observing that some commentators argue that OTS
alleged ethics violations because insurance covered these malpractice violations, providing a deep
pocket).
168. Id. at 996.
169. Id. at 1002 (citing Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal
Prosecutors:The Controversiesover the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 291, 312
(1992)).
170. Curtis, supra note 132, at 1010. See also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye
Scholer, FIRREA, and the Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case From the
Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 1115 (recommending enforcement, not of
ethics rules, but of federal law). The authors argue that sanctions against Kaye Scholer are not an
efficient enforcement mechanism because the real problem in the savings and loan crisis was with
regulators who failed to move quickly enough against institutions. Id. at 1130.
171. The statutes are challenged on economic and policy grounds, as well as on ethical grounds.
See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 170, at 1131 (questioning whether the prosecution of Kaye
Scholer will result in an improved banking system).
172. Robert G. Day, Administrative Watchdogs or ZealousAdvocates? Implicationsfor Legal Ethics
in the Face of ExpandedAttorney Liability, 45 STAN. L. REV. 645 (1993).
173. Id. at 667. Day argues that:
Heightened attorney liability generated through liberal enforcement of the Remedies Act
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framework, "confidentiality, the heretofore
presumed cornerstone of legal
174
ethics, would be effectively eviscerated.
Then Luban-style questions arise: is practice before a government agency
similar to criminal practice, or civil practice? Is it litigation, or regulatory
practice, or counseling? For some, any practice before a government agency
is equivalent to criminal practice, because the client faces the full enforcement powers of the government. So the strict criminal rule against any

disclosure in any circumstances reappears in the regulatory context.
According to Curtis, "[w]hatever the causes, it is clear that regulation of
lawyers' practice and enforcement of lawyers' ethical rules is slipping away
from the bar and into the hands of agencies and courts. This trend appears
to be irreversible."' 7 5 The battle is joined among lawyers, who dispute
which lawyers will be the final regulators, and responsibility is uncertain as
the norms for practice remain unclear.' 7 6 It remains to be seen whether the
courts will also regulate their fellow professionals or whether society must

turn to non-lawyers.
The confusion over ethical norms is also present in discussions of the
lawyer's obligation to report child abuse to state authorities. The diversity of
state reporting statutes shows that lawmakers disagree over whether lawyers should be treated as other professionals, or as other citizens, in the
requirement to report child abuse.1 77 The child abuse cases demonstrate
that the lines between past crimes, future crimes, and continuous crimes,
are tenuous."8 The state statutes also illustrate the difficulty of identifying

We cannot
could significantly affect the professional behavior of securities lawyers ....
allow the SEC to view its new powers as the basis for imposing a regulatory model of legal
ethics. The analysis of FIRREA shows that the heavy costs imposed by such a regime,
especially in terms of the effects on the attorney-client relationship, outweigh any potential
benefits in enforcement efficiency. This conclusion applies with even greater force to the
securities markets.
Id. at 683. But see Hazard, Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations,supra note 111 (arguing that the
Kaye Scholer case does not extend third party liability for lawyers).
174. Day, supra note 172, at 685.
175. Curtis, supra note 132, at 1017. And it appears to be happening in securities law as well, with
passage of the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990, which "like FIRREA, attempts
to provide regulators with more powerful and more flexible enforcement alternatives." See Day,
supra note 172, at 676.
176. Curtis, supra note 132, at 1012 ("There is simply too much shared history and experience
among the regulators, the judiciary, and the lawyers in the regulated community for regulators to
contemplate a slash-and-burn campaign to put law firms out of business, or for such a campaign to
succeed."). This comment cuts both ways; it may save the profession, but it may also mean more
failures of enforcement.
177. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The
Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DuKE L.J. 203, 216-24 (1992) (discussing how some
states, such as Florida, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, retain the attorney-client
privilege in their child-abuse reporting statutes).
178. Id. at 238-57 (noting that the lawyer who hears of past child abuse may have reason to think it
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what the law demands of the lawyer who must not violate existing law. It is
striking that in the midst of this confusion about the law of reporting child
abuse, one commentator has noted that the only option left to the lawyer is
to pursue "self-protection," or "self-preservation." 7 9
Thus in addition to concerns about self-interest, or failures of enforcement, current legal ethical standards offer moral confusion rather than
moral clarity. Such confusion may explain why Geoffrey Hazard has stated
that "neither the public at large nor lawyers themselves have a clear sense of
what the legal profession is,"1 8 ' or why Kronman entitled his book on the
legal profession "The Lost Lawyer." 8" A self-interested, unenforced, and
confused professional ethic hardly justifies a separate morality removed
from common moral standards.
The bar vigorously supports its separate ethic, content to claim that it
knows best what the standards for lawyers should be. Indeed the bar does
know best what is in the best interests of lawyers. Judge Sporkin's famous
question - "Where were the lawyers?, 1 82 - cuts to the heart, not only of
the savings and loan crisis, but of legal ethics. They thought they were in a
separate moral sphere, but to outsiders they appeared to be caught in public
with dirty hands. 83

is on-going or subject to repetition). See also Nancy E. Stuart, Child Abuse Reporting:A Challenge to
Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 243 (1987) (observing that because child
abuse is both a continuing and a future crime, it is unclear whether the attorney may reveal a client's
future misconduct as a continuing crime).
179. Mosteller, supra note 177, at 243. He explains:
The lawyer is thus placed in an extremely vulnerable position where both professional and
personal self-preservation require disclosure. In recent years, courts and ethics panels have
increasingly recognized the right of an attorney who is, or may become, the target of
criminal or civil action to make disclosures of confidential information for self-protection.
Id. Mosteller further notes that "[a]lthough courts and, to a lesser degree, ethics panels can provide
some assistance, legislative action is probably required to avoid disclosure by lawyers, who
understandably will act out of a need for personal and professional self-protection." Id. at 274.
180. Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 94, at 1242.
181. KRONMAN, supra note 1.
182. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (Sporkin, J.).
Sporkin asks:
Where were these professionals ... when these clearly improper transactions were being
consummated? Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions? Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions were effectuated? What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional
talent involved (both accounting and legal), why at least one professional would not have
blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this case.
Id.
183. See Nancy Rutter, Dirty Hands, 12 CAL. LAW. 30 (Jan. 1992) (reviewing the role of the law
firm Jones, Day in Keating's representation by tracing disputes over lawyers' responsibility in representation).
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IV. THE PROBLEM WITH DIRTY HANDS: A FLAWED ETHIC
With the failure of the separate morality argument, Walzer's account of
dirty hands - that the politician acts immorally - reasserts itself as a
plausible interpretation of legal ethics. Thus, lawyers at times act immorally
in their profession, and then need to ask forgiveness for their offenses.
Recall Luban's public interest lawyer.' 8 4 Walzer's interpretation of dirty
hands, however, is deeply flawed. 8 ' A parallel vision of legal ethics confronts the same weaknesses as Walzer's account of the politician. Indeed,
this vision faces additional difficulties, because practicing lawyers are not in
fact politicians.
Many commentators have criticized Walzer's acceptance of the dirty
hands of the politician. 18 6 The primary criticisms have been enunciated by
philosophers who disagree with Walzer's analysis of moral reasoning and
political scientists who dispute his interpretation of politics. 187 From these
criticisms emerge important guidelines for the avoidance of dirty hands in
legal ethics.
Philosophical criticisms of dirty hands suggest that legal ethics should be
grounded in clear principles. Moreover, these principles are general moral
principles that are not unique to the profession. Political scientists recommend mechanisms of accountability for politicians that would restrict dirty
hands behavior.' 88 Such mechanisms, including retrospection, generalization, and mediation, should be imported into legal ethics.' 8 9 Finally, some
philosophers have suggested that Walzer ignores the importance of character for political ethics. 9 ° So too has character been ignored in current
approaches to legal ethics.

A.

AN ETHIC OF PRINCIPLE

Some philosophers have claimed that Walzer's theory suffers from "confused philosophy and bad psychology" '9 1 because "[a]nalytically it is non184. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 293. See also discussion supra Part II.B
(discussing the contemporary view of dirty hands).
185. For a discussion of this interpretation, see Walzer, Dirty Hands, supra note 4.
186. See H. Oberdiek, Clean and Dirty Hands in Politics, 1 INT'L J. MORAL & SOC. STUD. 41, 53
(arguing that Walzer's account is confused in that "no one can act rightly by acting wrongly."). See
also W. Kenneth Howard, Must Public Hands Be Dirty?, 11 J. OF VALUE INQUIRY, 29, 34 (1977)
(proposing that Walzer's depiction of the dilemma of dirty hands provides a starting point for
analysis of political conduct, not an ending point).
187. See infra Part IV.A-C (analyzing dirty hands as a flawed ethic).
188. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 22.
189. These restrictions are especially important for Luban's public interest lawyer.
190. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, ProfessionalMorality and its Dispositions, in THE GOOD LAWYER,
supra note 34, at 259.
191. Oberdiek, supra note 186, at 53.
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sense to claim [Walzer's politician] was right in acting wrongly."'1 9 Kantian
theorists, as well as utilitarian philosophers, have rejected Walzer's ethical
analysis of the politician. 193 In his essay, Walzer rejected rule-utilitarianism
as well as the argument that there are no moral rules. 194 Instead, Walzer
argues that when humans violate rules, they know they have done something wrong, even if their action was the best thing to do under the
circumstances. 195
In other words, humans experience guilt. Rules, then, serve an important
purpose, and guilt helps restrain persons from breaking the rules too easily.
Guilt, with its suggestion of regret and reluctance, also shows that persons
are "good." This vision of rules and guilt undergirds the concept of dirty
hands: the politician cannot remain innocent and cannot act with clean
hands.
Disagreement with Walzer's concept of moral rules spans philosophical
schools. Alan Donagan, for example, has argued that "common morality,"
based on the "Hebrew-Christian" tradition and Kantianism, is sophisticated enough to provide moral principles that allow politicians to act with
clean hands.1 96 With such an approach to morality the problem of dirty
hands "dissolves".' 9 7 Other philosophers have argued that consequential-

ism dissolves the problem, but in a different way: the politician acts morally
when she maximizes good consequences. 198 If the action was the best thing
to do in the circumstances, then guilt is an inappropriate reaction.
Donagan's treatment of lawyers' ethics is consistent with his criticisms of
Walzer in The Theory of Morality, and is persuasive as an alternative account
of legal ethics.' 99 In The Theory of Morality, Donagan disputed Walzer's
account of the problem of dirty hands, and argued that common morality
provides principles that can guide political as well as personal decisionmaking. 2°° Donagan's common morality is "the part of common morality
according to the Hebrew-Christian tradition which does not depend on any
theistic belief., 20 1 In addition to Jewish and Christian traditions, Donagan
relies on the writings of Immanuel Kant. For Donagan, the image of

192. Howard, supra note 186, at 33.
193. See generally WAR AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (Marshall Cohen et al., eds., 1974).
194. Walzer, Dirty Hands, supra note 4, at 108.

195. Id. at 109.
196. ALAN DONAGAN,

THE THEORY OF MORALITY,

180-89 (1977) [hereinafter DONAGAN, THE

THEORY OF MORALITY].

197. Id. at 189.
198. See id. at 172-199 (discussing consequentiatist interpretations of dirty hands).

199. Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice, note 34, at 123.
200. DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY, supra note 196, at 180-89.

201. Id. at 29.
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politicians with dirty hands
is an unnecessary "sentimentalization" of
20 2
politics and of morality.
Donagan applies his common morality position to the analysis of lawyers'
ethics. 20 3 He compares the lawyer in the adversary system of justice to the
professional soldier. 20 4 Both professionals are subject to the general moral
standards governing all human persons, standards which cannot be overridden by claims of professional responsibility. Hence, for the soldier, just war
theory provides the norms for conduct.20 5 Thus, for Donagan, even one who
occupies a morally justified role as soldier, lawyer, or politician is not
allowed to do all things.20 6 The role is never a moral trump.
In contrast to the primacy of the institution in Luban's analysis, Donagan
focuses on moral principles that cross personal and institutional boundaries. Donagan's treatment of the Fugitive Slave Act illustrates the interaction of principles and institutions:
[A] lawyer cannot rationally justify practice in the adversary system on the
ground that only in that system is the dignity of human beings as
autonomous rational agents respected, and then proceed to invoke the
adversary system as justifying nineteenth-century lawyers in taking.part in
prosecutions under the Fugitive Slave Act - an act that flagrantly denied
respect to the dignity of slaves. According to its standard justification, the
adversary system rests on a moral principle that imposes conditions not
only on the scope of that justification but also on morally permissible
practice within the system itself. If those conditions are not observed, the
justification is invalidated.20 7
In contrast to Luban, Donagan rejects roles as defeasible presumptions.
Role morality does not justify the violation of general moral principles. He
explains that "[w]hen the established constraints of their profession fall
short of those of morality, lawyers cannot morally justify their actions by
pleading conformity with them any more than professional soldiers can with
those of theirs. ' 20 1 In the same way that just war criteria must guide the

202. Id. at 189.
203. Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice,supra note 6, at 123. See also SISSELA BOK, LYING 166-73
(1983) (analyzing the pervasiveness of deception in our personal and professional lives).
204. Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice,supra note 6, at 123.
205. Id.
206. Id. Charles Fried also draws the analogy between the lawyer and a soldier who fights in a war
decreed by others to be just, but does not use "dum-dum bullets." Fried, supra note 35, at 149.
207. Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice,supra note 6, at 133.
208. Id. at 135. Note Donagan's concern that lawyers have been especially lax in policing their
own profession for misconduct, an added reason to oppose a role morality. Id. at 134. For another
argument that suggests that lawyers should conform to general moral principles, see Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or PaternalisticJudgment: A Proposal for A
Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 764 (1990) (arguing that "lawyers should in all
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soldier's choices throughout his professional life, so too must moral principles always regulate the life of the professional attorney.
This insistence on moral principles is evident in Donagan's treatment of
confidentiality. The adversary system cannot justify maintaining confidentiality without moral limits, because "it is wrong to promise to keep secret
what you have no right to keep secret" and "promises to do wrong are
invalid." 2" The attorney's professional duty of confidentiality does not
override other moral obligations.2 1 ° If an attorney has a moral duty to
disclose information, then she must do so.
Donagan argues that lawyers already accept an exception to confidentiality, for continuing crimes.2 1 1 In moral analysis, to accept only the continuing
crimes exception is not persuasive. "More harm is sometimes caused 2 by
12
withholding information about past crimes than about continuing ones.,
Donagan rejects Freedman's and Luban's conclusion that Frank Armani
should not disclose. 2 13 He repudiates the actions of the lawyers in the Lake
Pleasant bodies case, and describes moral justifications of such conduct as
moving "from tragedy to farce." 2'14
In Donagan's assessment, not even the client's right against selfincrimination in the criminal context is sufficient to overcome the attorney's
moral obligation.2 1 5 In contrast to Luban, Donagan does not focus on the
nature of criminal law. Instead, his analysis concentrates on rights and
principles.
A murderer has no moral right whatever to escape incrimination by
concealing the victim's body, although it would be wrong to compel him or
her to reveal where it is. To the extreme wickedness of the original crime
there has been added the wickedness of obstructing justice, of calculated
cruelty to the victim's family and friends, and of desecrating a human
body. That the legal right against self-incrimination should entitle the
in that obstruction, cruelty, and
murderer to enlist professional associates 216
desecration is monstrous as moral theory.
Hence, in both political and legal ethics, rights and principles, not
institutions, drive the analysis. Donagan's approach to legal ethics avoids
the pitfalls of the current system. By invoking principles that apply in all
respects deal with their clients in the way they themselves would want to be treated if they were in
the client's position.").
209. Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice,supra note 6, at 142.
210. Id. at 142-43.
211. Id. at 142.

212. Id. at 144.
213. Id. at 141.
214. Id. at 140.

215. Id. at 143.
216. Id.
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realms of the moral life, he avoids the problem of the closed moral system.
In particular, his refusal to restrict
legal ethics to lawyers' principles avoids
2 17
the problem of self-interest.
Donagan's reliance on principles that apply across moral realms is
reminiscent of contemporary medical ethics.21 8 In medical ethics, the
principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice have
been widely accepted as important guidelines for interpreting the conduct
of health care professionals. 19 Principles, however, cannot do all the work
of medical ethics, and their use has faced some criticism. 22 ' Nonetheless,
they have offered a helpful framework for reflection on medical ethics. In
contrast, it is difficult to identify, much less to apply, the ruling principles of
legal ethics.
In medical ethics, the principle of autonomy has focused on the right of
the patient to determine her own treatment; much analysis has focused on
the meaning of informed consent.22 ' In theory, the principle mandates
patient control over her own treatment. In practice, commitment to that
principle has led to procedural safeguards, including the use of informed
consent forms. 222 The principle of non-maleficence instructs the doctor to
do no harm.2 23 The principle is often identified as the central mandate of
the Hippocratic oath. The physician who must touch the body of the patient
has an easy opportunity to do physical harm, and thus non-maleficence has
clear significance in the medical context. Linked to the principle of nonmaleficence is the professional's obligation to act for the well-being of the
patient, under the principle of beneficence.2 24 Under this principle, the
analysis examines when beneficence oversteps its boundaries and becomes
paternalism. 225 Finally, the principle of justice requires that persons be

217. But see MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW 97-99 (1993) (identifying the importance

of stories for legal ethics). Ball emphasizes the importance of narrative for Christian ethics; I prefer
an approach of principle within Christian legal ethics as well. See infra Part V (discussing the
perspective of religious ethics). But see Floyd, supra note 125, at 605 (supporting H. Richard
Niebuhr's ethic of responsibility because it "assumes that relationships between persons are more
important than purposes or principles."). Moreover, "the ethic of responsibility suggests that the
debate should focus less on relative abstractions, such as purposes and principles, and more on the
context of relationships in which lawyers and clients make ethical decisions." Id. at 590.
218. See generallyTOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
(3d ed. 1989) (offering an interdisciplinary and theoretical account of biomedical ethics).
219. See generally JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 107-10 (1984).

220. See generally id. at 220; Karen Lebacqz, Bio-ethics: Some Challenges from a Liberation
Perspective, in ON MORAL MEDICINE: THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS (Stephen E.
Lammers & Allen Verleg, eds., 1987).
221. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 218, at 67-74.
222. Id. at 74.
223. Id. at 120.
224. Id. at 194.
225. Id. at 209.
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given their due.22 6 This principle also raises important distributive questions
about access to health care.2 27
Principles exist in legal ethics. The Preamble to the Model Code states
that "fundamental ethical principles are always present to guide" the
lawyer.2 28 Within the Model Code, the "Ethical Considerations" provide a
body of principles to guide the lawyer in a variety of situations. Those
principles, however, are not immediately apparent, at least by name.
Standards of minimum competence and admission to the profession,
however, could be read as specifications of the principle of non-maleficence. 229 The concern that legal representation be available to those who
need it evokes the principle of justice. 23 0 The Model Code recommends an
of the lawyer and so
"informed" choice by the client in the selection
23 1
suggests respect for a principle of autonomy.
The format of the Model Rules makes them more difficult to read within a
framework of principle. The Model Rules are similar to statutes. This
presentation may explain why several commentators describe them as more
legalistic than earlier codes.23 2 Geoffrey Hazard, for example, has identified
a growing legalization of ethical standards. He reports that over the last
twenty-five years, legal ethics has been legalized, displacing internal standards for the bar.23 3 Hazard posits that "[w]hat were fraternal norms issuing
from an autonomous professional society have now been transformed into a
body of judicially enforced regulations., 234 His conclusion is striking: "As a
nor lawyers themselves have a clear sense
result, neither the public at large
23 5
of what the legal profession is."
Fraternal norms, however, are troubling as an ethical standard, because
they pose the dangers of the closed ethical system. An ethic that is strictly a
legal standard is also restrictive; "[i]t is this extralegal realm that defines
ethics., 236 An approach of principle may give a fuller context to legal ethics.
Investigation of the principles underlying legal ethics could provide a more
suitable framework for the profession. Such principles would at least

226. Id. at 256.
227. Id. at 283.
228. MODEL CODE pmbl.

229. MODEL CODE Canon 1 (A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession).
230. MODEL CODE Canon 2 (A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to
Make Legal Counsel Available).
231. MODEL CODE EC 2-6, 2-8.
232. See Gillers, What We TalkedAbout, supra note 126, at 248 (warning of the dangers of an ethic
that merely codifies legal duties, instead of appealing to a broader framework of ethical reasoning).
233. Hazard, The Futureof Legal Ethics, supra note 94, at 1240.
234. Id. at 1249.
235. Id. at 1242.
236. Gillers, What We Talked About, supra note 126, at 248.
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provide some framework for intensive discussion of the kinds of cases
lawyers face.2 37
One way to avoid the problem of dirty hands, then, is to root legal ethics
in principles. Beyond the adversary system excuse may stand the principle of
justice. Beyond an ideology of confidentiality loom questions of promisekeeping. 238 Representation in public interest law involves the principle of
autonomy as well as norms of justice. One philosophical corrective to the
problem of dirty hands, therefore, is reassessment and reidentification of
the principles that regulate lawyers' ethics.
B. PROCEDURAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Criticism of Walzer's politician has not stopped with philosophical accounts of moral reasoning. Political scientists have criticized his approach to
dirty hands as inaccurate in its representation of the political context.
Central to this critique is the assertion that democratic governments are not
ruled by solitary individuals who make choices that dirty their hands. Thus,
Walzer is accused of envisioning the romantic figure of the prince instead of
focusing on the moral demands upon the democratic leader.
Dennis Thompson argues that democracy changes the classical interpretation of the morality of the individual politician, and vitiates a dirty hands
approach to political ethics.23 9 No longer can we think of rulers as princes
and kings who perform immoral actions in secrecy. "Because democratic
officials are supposed to act with the consent of citizens.., they are not
uniquely24guilty
in the way that the problem in its traditional form pre0
sumes."
As a result, the politician cannot be judged by a separate standard: "[as]
237. But see William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and ClientAutonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L.
(pointing out difficulties in interpreting autonomy and paternalism in
individual cases).
238. Issues of promise-keeping may obligate lawyers to explain confidentiality to clients. See
generally Roy M. Sobelson, Lawyers, Clients and Assurances of Confidentiality: Lawyers Talking
Without Speaking, Clients Hearing Without Listening, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 703 (1988) (arguing
that initial disclosure allows a potential client to make informed choices about the breadth of her
disclosure, choosing a lawyer, or even deciding to forgo representation).
239. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 11.
240. Id. See also JUDITH N. SHKdLAR, ORDINARY VICES 243 (1984). Shklar argues that Walzer's
theory of dirty hands, as well as the theories of Machiavelli and Weber in which it is rooted,
presuppose an earlier stage of history, when individual statesmen were heroic, individual and
"highly personal" figures, on the model of Corneille. Id. She states:
REV. 213, 222-26 (1991)

[The] simple choice that Weber inherited from Machiavelli between a mere two roles,
immoral politics and moral privacy, does not make much sense in a liberal democratic
state.... His [Weber's] were the politics of the great gesture, and they still appeal to those
engaged intellectuals who like to think of 'dirty hands' as a peculiarly shaking, personal,
and spectacular crisis. This is a fantasy quite appropriate to the imaginary world, in which
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long as officials are assumed to act with the democratic approval of citizens,
officials cannot be burdened with any greater responsibility than citizens." 241 The major ethical questions then become questions of accountability in a democratic setting.
Thompson thus changes the focus from the dirty hands of one politician
to the many hands responsible in a democracy.24 2 The politician must
maintain accountability to the general public, but citizens must share
responsibility. Thompson's shift from a traditional theory of dirty hands to
democratic dirty hands is accompanied by a recognition that public officials
are frequently involved in "making marginal choices" with "mixed moral
results" leading to "only incremental 244
change., 243 He concludes: "Officials
agonize.,
they
than
more
compromise
With this perspective, Thompson challenges Walzer's view of the politician's guilt, and wonders why politicians are guilty if they act for us, with our
(presumed) consent.2 4 5 Instead of punishing politicians, citizens and politicians should ponder how to compensate others for the wrongs politicians
commit."'
Thompson recognizes that politicians continue to face the problem of
dirty hands in a democracy. 2 ' This temptation necessitates mechanisms of
accountability. The most obvious restraint is the democratic politician's
electoral accountability. Citizens in a democracy, however, cannot vote on
every decision made by politicians. Politicians at times must decide in
secret, for publicity would defeat the purpose of the act. Secrecy threatens
the democratic checks on the politician's conduct and so invites dirty hands,
248
indeed "doubly dirty hands.,
Thompson offers three methods of protecting democratic accountability
in conditions of secrecy: retrospection, generalization, and mediation.2 4 9
"Retrospective accountability" involves reviewing the decision after it has

these people see themselves in full technicolor. Stark choices and great decisions are
actually very rare in politics.
Id.
241. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 22.

242. Id.
243. Id. at 7.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 19. Thompson posits that: "Even on the assumption that ... deception is a wrong that
calls for social recognition, the problem remains that citizens themselves - the only judges who
have the final authority to condemn the deceiver - must be presumed to endorse the deception."
Id.
246. Id. at 22.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 23. "Doubly dirty" hands occur because the vices of concealment are added to the vices
of the original deed.
249. Id. at 22-32.
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been made. 250 The problem with such review is that the damage has already
occurred. Moreover, the secret may be kept for so long that reforms of
future practice cannot be made. For example, by the time the Cuban Missile
Crisis decisions were made public, it was far too late for any of the actors to
be held accountable. Thompson insists on early post-decision revelation of
political25 1actions, with a recognition that "[t]he license to deceive ex'
pires.
The inadequacies of retrospection make prior judgment a preferable
option. Such prior judgment can occur through generalized public discussion of the types of decisions that a politician should make. 2 For example,
general policies on the use of patrol cars can be delineated, without the
disclosure of particulars that would jeopardize good police work.
Generalization cannot deal with all possible particulars. Therefore, mediation provides a third form of accountability.25 3 The model mediation
draws from is the oversight of congressional committees. The advantage of
mediation is that it brings a broader perspective into the decision-making.
According to Thompson, congressional oversight reminds us that if the
perspective of overseer and overseen is too similar, then real accountability
does not occur.25 4 Yet if the range of publicity is too broad, then the
necessary secrecy is endangered.
Thompson acknowledges that all three methods have weaknesses and
that they cannot eliminate dirty hands.25 5 But, he argues, the methods can
be made more effective. Thompson argues that: "Retrospection can be
strengthened by limiting the duration of secrecy. Generalization can be
enhanced through prohibitions on certain kinds of activities. Mediation can
work better if in major disagreements of256principle, legislators expand the
public that deliberates on the decisions.
If, as Luban asserts, law is politics, and lawyers act with the dirty hands of
politicians, then legal ethics should be held to similar standards of accountability. If democracy limits dirty hands in the American political context,
then legal dirty hands also demand some democratic accountability. Some
lawyers, such as state judges and district attorneys who gain office through
election, face such accountability. But most lawyers are not so accountable.
For lawyers, the obvious parallel to defeat at the polls is dismissal by the
client. When lawyers lose a client, however, they usually continue to
practice law, and they usually are paid. Furthermore, lawyers tend to escape
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 32.
Id.
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accountability in the press because the media do not apply the same scrutiny
to lawyers and their reputations that they apply to political representatives.
Thus, mere dismissal of lawyers by clients does not provide a sufficient
democratic check upon dirty hands. In legal ethics, dirty hands romanticizes
the role of the politician and thus of the lawyer.
Luban attempts to democratize his political account of public interest
law, but he fails to demand accountability from lawyers. We have already
seen that he offers certain limits to client manipulation by lawyers in the
public interest setting." 7 He suggests that the decision of the lawyer should
usually, although not always, be put to the vote of the group; "a political
decision should be made by political processes."2'58
Moreover, Luban excuses dirty hands conduct if "(1) the clients are also
committed to the cause; (2) the outcome of the manipulation represents the
will of the political group; (3) the manipulative behavior is not itself
abhorrent to the political group."25' 9
Luban addresses these political questions at length in his examination of
class action lawsuits. 260 Here the lawyer's dilemma, between representation
of the individual and representation of the group, or the cause, becomes
acute. Luban offers a solution based in political theory. He bases this theory
on the " 'own-mistakes principle,' which we may formulate as follows:
Provided that the group's actions do not trench on the rights of outsiders or
otherwise violate sound morals, it must be permitted to make its own
mistakes. The general will trumps prudence., 261 Luban acknowledges that
democracy, with the "own-mistakes principle," relies
on an informed
26 2
public, or else the principle is a "recipe for disaster.,
Luban focuses on what the lawyer must do in order to represent the class.
Such representation encounters serious difficulties. The lawyer may not
have access to the will of all members of the group. Some members of the
group may be ill-informed about the class' well-being. Moreover, the
interests of future generations may be at stake, and the attorney may wish to
include these interests in her analysis.
Luban identifies four types of representation that may be involved in the
class-action suit. The first is direct delegation by clients, which occurs "when
263
the class is small enough and compact enough to be canvassed regularly.,
Indirect delegation, the second type of class action representation, occurs
when the class members select representatives of their views, usually
257. See supra Part II.B (discussing the new standard view of dirty hands).
258. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 339.
259. Id. at 340.
260. Id. at 341-58.
261. Id. at 344.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 351.
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because the class is large as well as politically mobilized. 26 4 The third type of
representation, interest representation, occurs when representatives of the
class are chosen, not by class members, but by the lawyer. 26" This variety of
representation occurs when the class is "unmobilized. '' 266 Finally, bestworld representation occurs when the lawyer takes into account future
members of the267class; "it involves lawyers making unilateral decisions and
'
value choices.
Luban lists these types of class action representation in descending order
of preference; direct representation is preferred but not mandated. The
ethical conflicts for the lawyer are especially difficult when the interests of
future generations are at stake. When the issues are most complex in class
action suits, therefore, the decision will fall to the ethical discretion of the
268
lawyer.
Then, Luban links the double agent and the class action problems. "My
approach to the problem of class conflicts is to require the lawyer to be as
representative as it is possible to be - responsibly representative of the
client class as a whole; and my approach to the double agent problem
is
' 269
based on the fact that mutual political commitments are consensual.
Luban proposes the political model of public interest law because of a
laudable commitment to social reform, out of a desire to encourage
"morally activist" lawyers. He thinks the client control objection, as well as
270
limits on class action suits, restrict the efforts of the poor to seek justice.
He fears that traditional legal ethics favor wealthy clients at the expense of
poor clients. 27 '
Although these commitments are all commendable, they leave the lawyer
- and thus her clients - without protection against the dirty hands
dilemma. Even in public interest law, some commentators have noted the
indicia of lawyers' self-interest. 2 72 For example, the class of plaintiffs in a
class action suit may be expanded, with little benefit to the actual parties.
Meanwhile, lawyers profit from the additional fees awarded to them.2 73
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 391. See also William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and

Professional Ethics, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 216-72 (criticizing

jurisprudential justifications of legal professionalism and arguing that non-professional advocacy
would lead to a more equitable distribution of legal services).
271. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 370.

272. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 208, at 776 (noting that public interest lawyers may be
self-interested and concerned about promoting their reputations).
273. There are proposals to limit abuses in contingency fees, and some recognition that the
abuses are serious. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Contingency Fee Windfalls Are Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
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Moreover, in such lawsuits, the lawyer may desire to reform the law in order
to enhance her reputation. Luban's treatment of public interest law reminds
us that the Model Rules and Model Code serve an important purpose in
guiding the ethical conduct of lawyers, and that the absence of such general
norms can at times harm clients.2 7 4
Luban's political model of the public interest lawyer lacks the basic
representative check of voting. Moreover, given the problems associated
with lawyers' underenforcement of ethical standards, retrospective review is
a weak candidate for protection. Disclosure may not occur until long after
damage to the client can be rectified, if ever. The Model Rules and the Model
Code may be the generalizations available to the profession, but Luban
challenges their use in public interest law. Thus general norms of client
loyalty do not apply.
Luban's theory may provide some generalization, but it is not binding on
the profession. Indeed, Luban suggests that even lawyers are divided on his
approach to public interest law,27 5 so it is difficult to find the generalization
that would protect clients or society. Although "[g]eneralization can be
enhanced through prohibitions on certain kinds of activities,,

276

it is not

clear what prohibitions Luban's lawyer faces.
Thus mediation exists as the third check, but Luban has not written an
oversight committee into his ethic. The judge who hears the case is the
overseer, but by then the enforcement problems associated with a closed
ethic reappear. Thompson warned against too close an identification between overseer and overseen in mediation.27 7 But precisely such an identification can occur within the realm of public interest law.
Luban approvingly cites Deborah Rhode's conclusion that class action
suits pose "intractable" moral problems. 278 He understates, however, the
conflicts that Rhode chronicles in telling detail, such as the difficulties of

Feb. 11, 1994, at Al, B18 (reporting on the Manhattan Institutes proposal to place more precise
limits on contingency fees).
274. One way to interpret Charles Fried's analogy of the lawyer as friend is as a critique of
Luban's account of public interest law from the perspective of principle. Fried's comments implicitly
address Luban's account of public interest law. Although Fried's article is prior to Luban's book, his
argument is a counter to Luban's argument about the client control objection. "[T]he concept of
legal friendship was introduced to answer the argument that the lawyer is morally reprehensible to
the extent that he lavishes undue concern on some particular person." Fried, supra note 35, at 141.
See also Schneyer, Professionalismas Politics,supra note 99 (identifying advantages of rules to legal
profession and the function they serve in protecting clients).
275. See LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 293-316 (refuting arguments offered by
critics of public interest law).
276. THoMPSON, supra note 5, at 32.
277. Id. at 30.
278. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 341 (citing with approval Deborah L. Rhode,
Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982) [hereinafter Rhode, Class Conflicts]).
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representing group members, uncertain enforcement by the courts, and
self-interest of the lawyers.
Rhode's solution also proves more subtle than Luban's. She too introduces politics to the discussion. Politics, however, does not provide a dirty
hands excuse. Instead, Rhode notes that political discourse has been more
sophisticated than law in its analysis of representation. 279 Rhode proposes
procedural solutions to the problems of class action conflicts, emphasizing
the need for stronger enforcement by the courts.28 0 For example, she
recommends that courts maintain better factual records on notice-giving
and on adequacy of client representation." She also proposes adjustments
to attorney's fees, and limits on lawyers' abilities to negotiate their fees. 8 2
Finally, she suggests the presence of court-appointed advisors. 83 Luban
may agree with these restrictions, but he does not require them.
Furthermore, Rhode does not discard traditional legal rules in this
context. Although Luban moves too quickly to accept dirty hands, Rhode
holds out more possibility for legal ethics when she states that "to acknowledge the limits of our technical expertise and ethical certitude is not, of
course, to abandon all hope of improvement, ' ' 2 ' and then proposes reforms
for the class action lawsuit.
Thus Luban translates law into politics and examines class action suits
through the prism of democracy. But the lawyer is not a politician. Public
interest law as understood by Luban does not possess the safeguards to
protect against the problem of dirty hands. In the definitional move from
law to politics, Luban releases the lawyer from responsibility. Giving a
lawyer a license to practice politics with dirty hands licenses too much. 85
Although Thompson's democratic accountability pertains to the lawyerredefined-as-politician, it is also useful for all of legal ethics. While philosophical accounts of dirty hands suggest changes in the content of legal
ethics, procedural restrictions are also valuable.
Retrospective accountability is difficult in the context of the lawyer-client

279. Rhode, Class Conflicts, supra note 278, at 1193.
280. Id.at 1247.
281. Id. at 1248-49.
282. Id. at 1251.
283. Id. at 1256.
284. Id. at 1243.
285. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 208, at 776-77 (recognizing that public interest lawyers may
be selfishly motivated to promote reputation). Menkel-Meadow argues for a "Golden Rule of
Candor [which] would require such lawyers to fully disclose their motivations to clients who may be
acting in [a] named representative capacity .... This forces the lawyer to be candid about his own
'vicarious altruism' and to see ifthe client shares similar altruistic values." Id.See also William H.
Simon, ClassActions - Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 391 (1972) (stating that
"Rule 23 results in unjust enrichment to some members of the legal profession with little
corresponding benefit to the public.").
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relationship, because it depends upon disclosure, the bane of the profession. Generalization already exists in the profession through the Model
Rules and the Model Code. However, as I suggested above, such generalization would be more effective if it included some discussion of general
principles. Finally, mediation profits from an expansion of the public that
regulates the profession. So too, legal ethics would be well-served by the
presence of non-lawyers in regulatory bodies and disciplinary committees.28 6
David Wilkin's proposals for lawyer regulation address these procedural
concerns.2 87 Although Wilkins describes the ABA as supporting "disciplinary agencies operating under the supervision of state supreme courts,, 28 8 he
prefers a contextual model of enforcement. In addition to disciplinary
controls, Wilkins identifies liability controls such as third party suits;
institutional controls such as Rule 11 sanctions; controls from agencies like
the SEC, IRS, and OTS; and legislative controls. 8 9
All four types of regulation are necessary for efficient enforcement of
legal ethics, with "optimal compliance., 29 ° Wilkins argues that "no single
enforcement system is likely to address all categories of lawyer misconduct
efficiently."2 9' 1 While he "does not provide definitive answers, ' 29 2 Wilkins
proposes a context-dependent approach to regulation:
Implicit in the many claims about how lawyers should be regulated is the
assumption that a single enforcement structure will be appropriate for all

286. Kronman's analysis of the problem of dirty hands suggests the need for a variety of
perspectives. He identifies the moral question for politicians as whether they can keep their
ruthlessness within bounds. Some politicians are more at risk of succumbing to ruthlessness than
others. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 102-03. Kronman claims that politicians most at risk are those who
view their opponents as false or evil. Id. at 103. He contends that: "The dangers of ruthlessness will
be lower, by contrast, if one starts by acknowledging the incommensurable diversity of human
goods." Id. at 104. One barrier against ruthlessness is to be open to the convictions of others.
Kronman claims, "some political ideals offer more protection than others and that the ideal of
political fraternity offers most of all." Id. at 105. Political fraternity is an ideal of "empathic
pluralism." Id.
287. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 139. See also Martyn, supra note 134
(recommending a variety of procedures in order to improve lawyer competence). Martyn's recommendations include revised standards for bar entry, peer review, continuing education, performance
measures, and legislation. Id. Her essay recommends a solution also backed by Thompson: publicity.
She identifies "[t]he lack of publicity and consequent secrecy that shroud the grievance process" as
"critical problems that hinder the ability of many jurisdictions to respond adequately through their
disciplinary process." Id. at 737. Martyn argues that publicity is essential for deterrence of bad
lawyering, "[i]ncreased lay representation at the screening and investigative stages should also be
sought." Id. at 739.
288. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 140, at 802.
289. Id. at 873-86.
290. Id. at 847-48.
291. Id. at 804.
292. Id. at 886.
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lawyers in all contexts. This unitary vision, however, fails to account for
the diversity in both the structure of the legal marketplace and society's
expectations of the profession.2 93
In the essay on regulation of lawyers, Wilkins prescinds from examination
the content of the rules. In doing so, he presupposes a single content of
rules. 29 4 The dirty hands literature reminds us that content is crucial as well
as enforcement, and that both content and enforcement require participation of those outside the profession. Wilkins cannot adequately address the
problem of dirty hands without reflection on content.
The context-dependent solution is evident in Wilkins' analysis of the
Kaye Scholer case, and is enriched by reflection on the content of the
ethic. 295 He notes that both sides in the Kaye Scholer controversy cited the
Model Rules in their defense.2 96 Thus, lawyers still search for the "unitary"
guideline that rules the profession, but such an approach is outdated.2 97
Wilkins opines that "there are good reasons for believing that, despite all of
the rhetoric to the contrary, the Kaye Scholer case has sounded the final
death knell for the traditional model of legal ethics in the context of
regulatory practice. ' 29 8 A regulatory law practice requires a contextdependent set of guidelines that take account of the specifics of the
regulatory setting. Wilkins suggests that the attorney be guided by the
"middle-level principles" of "independent counseling, cooperation and
299
disclosure: ,
First, thrift lawyers should be under a special duty to give their clients
"independent" and "candid" advice concerning regulatory compliance,

where independence means that the advice is disinterested and objectively reasonable and candor requires a thorough review of any contrary
position taken by the regulators as well as an unbiased assessment of how
relevant legal decision makers would rule on the matter if they knew all of

293. Id. at 887.
294. Wilkins acknowledges that enforcement gives a "substantive tilt" to the interpretation of the
rules. Id. at 811. He identifies three types of arguments that occur within discussion of these four
regulatory controls. They are content, compliance, and independence arguments "according to
whether they focus on the substantive content of the rules to be enforced, the ability of an
enforcement system to produce substantial compliance at acceptable costs, or the relationship
between a particular sanctioning system and the status of lawyers as independent professionals." Id.
at 809. The independence arguments are the type we have seen earlier in this Article, where the bar
claims that the lawyer needs independence in order to protect clients. Independence arguments are
also a manner of arguing about content. Id. at 853.
295. David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1147 (1993) [hereinafter Wilkins, Making Context Count].
296. Id. at 1148.
297. Id. at 1148-49.
298. Id. at 1216.
299. Id.
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the pertinent facts. Second, thrift lawyers should be under an affirmative
duty to cooperate with the regulators' efforts to collect information and
should be prohibited from taking any action or otherwise assisting their
clients in impeding the regulators' ability to reach informed judgments.
Third, in the event of a material dispute over the meaning or scope of an
applicable regulation, thrift lawyers should be required to disclose the
existence of the dispute and the grounds for their position. This disclosure
should be made both internally, to the most disinterested thrift decision
maker available (generally the board of directors), and externally, to the
regulators.3 ° °
Wilkins adds that thrift officials should be able to enforce these standards
unless "private enforcement efforts are adequately vindicating the government's regulatory interests.' 30 1
Wilkins' resolution of the Kaye Scholer case addresses the content of the
ethic, and it is an ethic of principle. Wilkins would enable regulators to
enforce these principles against lawyers. With disclosure requirements,
general principles, and outside regulators, he meets many of Thompson's
concerns for accountability and Donagan's concern for moral reasoning.
Perhaps he has sounded the "death knell""3 2 for dirty hands, but not, as
some fear, for the legal profession.
C. CHARACTER: THE MISSING PIECE?

Philosophical changes in the content of legal ethics, as well as procedural
reforms in enforcement, may help to limit dirty hands conduct. However,
the last bulwark against dirty hands is character. Walzer placed character at
the heart of his portrayal of the politician when he insisted that the
politician's reluctance or guilt provided important limitations on the politician's conduct.30 3 So too may character serve as the last resort for legal
ethics.
Bernard Williams addresses the importance of character when he argues
that "professional morality" is a better label than "role morality." 3"
Williams asserts that divergences in role morality are not the important
issue in legal ethics, because fulfilling different expectations for different
roles may not raise conflicts in professionals who anticipate these differences and accept them as part of the normal demands of professional life.30 5
Williams argues that it is not the divergence between acts undertaken in the
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. at 1181-82.
Id.
Id. at 1216.
Walzer, Dirty Hands, supra note 4, at 111-12.
Williams, supra note 190, at 259.
Id. at 260.
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professional context and in the non-professional context that is morally
significant, because many professional acts, including cross-examination of
witnesses, simply cannot be performed in an unprofessional setting.3" 6
Instead, Williams suggests that the dispositions acquired in the professional setting are telling; these attitudes may be consistent with the dispositions of general morality, but at times they may not be. He states, "[t]his will
have the result that the professionals get used to doing, from time to time, as
an expression of their professional dispositions, acts that they find distasteful in virtue of their general dispositions."3 7
Another possibility is that professionals may eventually discard their
general dispositions in favor of their professional dispositions.30 8 The risk is
that as lawyers act professionally, they may develop dispositions that lead
them to become the kind of person others do not want them to be. 3" These
dispositions may be troubling precisely because they blind professionals to
moral considerations. Gerald Postema opposes just such "detachment" in
the professional life, and argues310for integration strategies which will encourage professional responsibility.
Williams concludes that lawyers must retain some qualms about their
professional morality. The argument parallels one he makes about the need
for reluctance in politicians:
[T]here are actions which remain morally disagreeable even when politically justified. The point of this is not at all that it is edifying to have
politicians who, while as ruthless in action as others, are unhappy about it.
Sackcloth is not suitable dress for politicians, least of all successful ones.
The point ... is that only those who are reluctant or disinclined to do the
necessary have much chance of not
morally disagreeable when it is really
31 1
necessary.
not
is
it
when
it
doing
For legal ethics, Williams concludes that a casuistry or a code is not
sufficient; the focus must be on the sort of person one is.
One approach in contemporary legal ethics has been to emphasize the

306. Id.
307. Id. at 263-64.
308. Id. at 264. Richard Wasserstrom makes a related point. He mentions that one of the
attractions of a separate role morality may be psychological. A role morality renders the moral life
less complex and challenging, and therefore more comfortable psychologically. Wasserstrom, supra
note 72, at 25-37.
309. Williams, supra note 190, at 268.
310. Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in THE GOOD
LAWYER, supra note 35, at 286-314.
311. Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 64

(Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978). See also KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 105 (remarking that politicians
are always tempted to ruthlessness, and so tactics, especially recognition of the plurality of goods,
must be established to limit ruthlessness).
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judgment of the individual lawyer. For example, William Simon has proposed an ethic of discretion for lawyers.3 12 This ethic rejects "categorical"
approaches to legal ethics, especially the so-called libertarian and regulatory models. 313 "Libertarian" names the traditional model of attorney
loyalty to client, while "regulatory" captures the ethic of loyalty to the
public arising from the lawyer's duties as an officer of the court.3" 4 Weinstein's vision of the thrift lawyer exemplifies Simon's regulatory category.31 5
In the ethic of discretion, the judgment of the individual lawyer is central
and "the basic consideration should be whether assisting the client would
further justice."3'16 Discretion is a complicated undertaking, but Simon
argues that lawyers already accept it for the judge and prosecutor and
therefore, he proposes the discretionary approach for all of legal ethics.3 17
Simon rejects the developments in legal ethics that pit law against
morality, holding that: "The discretionary approach ... rejects the common
tendency to attribute the tensions of legal ethics to a conflict between the
demands of legality on the one hand and those of nonlegal, personal or
ordinary morality on the other."3 1 8 Instead of contrasting legal and moral
choices, "both alternatives could readily be portrayed as competing legal
values."3'1 9
While this move to identify conflicting legal, rather than moral claims,
may capture the moral aspect of law, one wonders what kind of judgment
this lawyer will develop as she translates all moral issues into legal ones.
Simon does not link discretion to the character of the lawyer. Instead,
individual judgment and individual decision-making are key, but one looks
in vain for the habit of reluctance favored by Williams and Walzer.3 2 °
In contrast, Kronman emphasizes character in his picture of the lawyer32
statesman. "The ideal of the lawyer statesman was an ideal of character." 1
Kronman resists portrayals of the lawyer that emphasize his technical

312. Simon, Ethical Discretionin Lawyering, supra note 131.
313. Id. at 1083-84.
314. Id. at 1085-87.
315. See Weinstein, supra note 161, at 62 (stating that thrift lawyers must not aid clients in
implementing illegal schemes).
316. Simon, EthicalDiscretionin Lawyering, supra note 131, at 1090-91.
317. Id. at 1083.
318. Id. at 1113-14.
319. Id. at 1114.
320. Simon rejects the argument that the ethic of discretion is unconstrained, but the checks are
not identified. Id. at 1126-29. Seb Schneyer, Moral Philosophy'sStandard Misconception, supra note
14, at 1557 (faulting Simon's earlier work for inconsistency). Schneyer criticized the Model Code for
too much latitude while calling for an ethic of individual discretion, stating "In my book, giving the
individual lawyer more discretion means turning what would otherwise be professional obligations
into personal privileges." Id.
321. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 16 (holding that: "For this ideal affirmed that a lawyer can
achieve a level of real excellence in his work only by acquiring certain valued traits of character.").
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competence at the expense of good judgment. Instead, the lawyerstatesman relies upon practical wisdom in his practice.
Kronman insists that "the relationship between deliberation and charac~,22
ter" is "at the heart of the classical ideal of the lawyer-statesman.
Kronman's book traces how this ideal of the character has been lost. Trends
in the legal academy, legal education, and law practice have weakened the
appeal, and the "profession now stands in danger of losing its
statesman's
3
32

soul."

If character is the last protection against dirty hands, then non-lawyers
may also be in some danger from a profession without character. That is
why philosophical and procedural reforms are necessary. Legal ethics thus
should be reformed to incorporate an ethic of principle. Furthermore, the
procedures of legal ethics - the writing and enforcement of the rules should be changed.
V. RELIGIOUS ETHICS: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE
What is the metaphor of dirty hands? For some authors, it is the
obligation to act immorally. For others, it is the obligation to act under a
different morality. At times it is moral guilt. Elsewhere it is moral complexity. My impression is that the dirty hands metaphor is rooted in another
concept, not always explicitly named, the concept of sin.
Theological - not religious - references pop up frequently in the
literature. Walzer labelled his solution to the problem of dirty hands the
Catholic position, even though it is not representative of that tradition.32 4
Luban, after his lengthy exposition of public interest dirty hands, concludes
response to dirty hands behavior must be to forgive - as Jesus
that 2our
3 5
did.
A. "COMMON MORALITY"
This appeal to religion is an interesting move in ethical analysis, especially when it appears in literature that does not purport to be about
religion. In many cases, such as the works of Luban and Walzer, it plays a
rhetorical or heuristic role. For other writers, such as Alan Donagan,
religion plays a more substantive role. Donagan argues that his theory of
322. Id. at 27.

323. Id. at 1.
324. I have argued this point in a previous article. Leslie Griffin, The Problem of Dirty Hands, 17 J.
REL. ETHICS 31 (1989).

supra note 14, at 336 (citing HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
239 (1958)). Luban relies on Arendt's reading of Jesus's political and religious
identification of forgiveness as "the necessary corrective for the inevitable damages resulting from
action." Id.
325.

LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE,

CONDITION
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morality is rooted in the "Hebrew-Christian tradition. 3 26 Donagan's analysis - with its emphasis on common morality and its suspicion of separate
role moralities - more accurately captures the central insights of Jewish
and Christian responses to the problem of the lawyer's dirty hands.32 7 While
Christian writers have long acknowledged the moral complexities, difficulties, and limitations of professional roles, their message is ultimately one
that limits the conduct that the lawyer can undertake in the name of the
role. In contrast to the assumptions of Luban and Walzer, their central
message is not that the lawyer resign herself to sin and ask for forgiveness or
punishment.
For example, Thomistic natural law theory has provided the underpinning for much of Roman Catholic ethics. In Thomistic thought, the natural
law provides a standard by which human politics as well as human law are
judged. The ruler and the laws are not automatically obeyed because given
by God, but are assessed according to their consistency with the natural
law.328
For Thomas, an unjust law is not a law and is therefore not binding on the
individual's conscience.3 29 Thomas provides criteria by which to judge
human laws, the thirteenth-century equivalent, perhaps, of a contemporary
court's four-part test. The law must be "ordained to the common good,"
while "not exceed[ing] the power of the lawgiver., 330 Moreover, "burdens
are [to be] laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and
with a view to the common good." 3 3 ' Finally, human law must not be
"opposed to the Divine good - idolatry. 3 3 2 Thomas notes that if a law in
most cases promotes the common good, but is in some instances harmful,
one should not follow it in the harmful instance.33 3
In both politics and the law, therefore, moral standards must guide the
conduct of the individual. Justice requires that individuals not violate the
natural law in either their personal or professional lives. Although specific
statements about the morality of lawyers do not emerge from Thomas'
writings, Thomistic theory clearly applies a consistent standard to common
morality and the professional morality of the lawyer.
In later centuries, Catholic moralists address more specific examples of
326. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing dirty hands as an ethic of principle).
327. But see Floyd, supra note 125, at 607 (rejecting "ordinary morality" in favor of an (H.
Richard) Niebuhrian ethic of responsibility because" 'ordinary morality' is a concept with questionable meaning.").
328. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, 92, 1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. Christian
Classics 1911).
329. I-I, 95, 2; I-IT, 96, 4.
330. I-I, 96, 4.
331. 1-11, 96, 4.
332. I-I, 96, 4.
333. I-1I, 96, 6.
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lawyers' ethics. For example, the Koch-Preuss twentieth century manual of
moral theology refers to lawyers under the title "Duties of Restitution," a
section that considers when a person is required to repair the damage done
to others.3 34 A popular moral principle from the manualist tradition, the
principle of cooperation, assists the calculus. The principle of cooperation is
a tool of casuistry, by which the individual can determine what is right and
what is wrong in both professional and personal spheres. Cooperation
means "concurrence with another person in an act that is morally wrong. '
Catholic moralists then distinguish between formal and material cooperation with evil; the former is always prohibited, but the latter is permitted for
a proportionate reason.3 36
Lawyers can be guilty of cooperation, and they must be careful in their
work to avoid formal cooperation with evil. "A person co-operates with
another in injustice by counsel if he gives him advice or urges motives or
shows him how to proceed, in doing evil.", 33 7 Because the advisor is the
"secondary author" of the injustice, she is required to restore whatever the
principal in wrongdoing fails to restore. If a lawyer gives such advice, she is
the "moral cause of the damage, and, as such, bound to make restitution. 33 8
Koch and Preuss pursue further technicalities in their analysis. If the
lawyer's advice is revoked and the reason for its revocation is given, the
lawyer frees herself of liability. 339 But if a reason is not given, the lawyer is
responsible pro rata. The lawyer is not culpable if the client was already
committed to the evil act, because there is no causation on the attorney's
part. Nor is she responsible for restitution if she counsels a lesser evil,
because the moral interpretation of her action is that she is doing good in
her attempt to minimize the damage. 34 0 Finally, a lawyer who undertakes
unjust lawsuits is guilty of sinful cooperation, but a lawyer who defends a
thief or criminal (even a guilty one) is not at fault.
Another example of the interpretation of a religious tradition in light of
contemporary legal ethics is provided by Basil F. Herring's review of
halakhic sources. 341 Herring distinguishes the halakhic interpretation of the
lawyer in the judicial system from the American legal system. Jewish law is
similar to an inquisitorial system, in which the judge plays an active role in

334. 5

ANTONY KOCH & ARTHUR PREUSS, HANDBOOK OF MORAL THEOLOGY: MAN'S DUTIES TO

His FELLOWMEN 394 (1933).
335. EDWIN F. HEALY, S.J., MEDICAL ETHICS 101 (1956).

336. Id. at 102.
337. KOCH & PREUSS, supra note 334, at 394.

338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 395.
341. BASIL F. HERRING,

JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHA FOR OUR TIME

(1984).
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searching for the truth. Halakhic interpretation of legal ethics is complicated, because there was no class of professional lawyers in ancient Israel.34 2
But Jewish law is clearly regulated by moral principles. For example,
judges use instruments of coercion, including the death penalty, but these
procedures are clearly moral, because they are biblically prescribed.34 3 In
Jewish law, the two purposes of the judicial process are to attain the truth
and to help the disadvantaged. 3 ' Herring evaluates three areas of the law
- the provision of legal advice, representation in court, and the presumption of innocence - in light of these two goals.
First, Herring notes the halakhic presumption against giving legal advice
to a litigant.3 4 5 The danger is that if the lawyer explains the law to a litigant,
she may tailor her account of the facts to the requirements of the law.34 6 The
first purpose of the law, to attain the truth, is therefore better served by the
client's ignorance of the law.
Herring recounts some dispute among the sources as to whether or not
the prohibition against the provision of legal advice to the litigants is
absolute, because the second goal of the legal system, helping the disadvantaged, may be relevant.34 7 The lawyer clearly must not give advice which will
skirt the law's moral requirements. Nor can he advocate improper but
effective arguments, even in support of a just cause. Some rabbis, however,
allow the lawyer to give advice if the claim is just, and if the lawyer knows
that the litigant is honest and will not abuse the law. 348 Then both goals of
the legal system are served.
Jewish law is also hesitant to name a proxy to represent litigants in
court.34 9 The fear is that the participation of third parties will block the
truth and prevent responsibility, because face-to-face confrontation is the
chosen means of arriving at the truth. This practice, however, has changed
over the centuries. Herring concludes that "halakhists have come to accept
the practice of legal counsel before the court, in spite of earliest [sic]
opposition to such practices. ',35° Yet this suspicion of lawyers permeates the
tradition, such that another author refers to the lawyer as a "concession," a

342. Id. at 99.
343. See id. at 157-59 (discussing textual arguments supporting the death penalty under Jewish
law).
344. Id. at 99.
345. Id. at 100.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 103.
348. Id. at 102-03.
349. Id. at 106.
350. Id. at 113. The date of this change is uncertain; Herring cites reports of the sixteenth,
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Id.
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and "an obstacle to ascertaining truth," who is "superflu"hindrance"
' '3 5 1

ous.

The purpose of discernment of the truth influences the third topic, the
presumption of innocence. Jewish law recognizes a presumption of innocence for the accused party, so the lawyer can assume that her client is
innocent and therefore worthy of defense.3 52 An admission of guilt, however, destroys the presumption of innocence and excludes the possibility of
legal representation for one who confesses to a crime.35 3 When a litigant
admits guilt, the counselor's role is to urge the client to present the truth
before the court.3 5 4
Note in all three instances the sharp differences between Herring's
analysis and that of Monroe Freedman.3 5 5
Herring's halakhic response and the Koch-Preuss calculus of cooperation
and restitution are mere examples of ethical analysis, neither of which
represent full traditions. Nor could they do so, because both traditions insist
that particular circumstances are pertinent to the analysis of moral acts.
Yet in both traditions, law is forever permeated with a moral dimension.
The existence of professional roles does not rid individuals of their moral
concerns, of their sense of the moral purposes of the law, and of their
responsibilities within their roles to the broader society, to "third parties"
who may be affected by "professional" conduct.
Martin Luther and his Reformation followers provided an alternative to
the Thomistic analysis of law and of the moral life to Christian believers. If
adherence to a role morality is to be found in Christian ethics, one can
expect it to arise in the writings of the German Reformer. Many elements of
his theology support such a conclusion. Luther bases his theology in a belief
that sola scriptura - scripture alone - is the source of Christian faith,35 6
and so rejects the Greek philosophical foundations of Thomistic ethics,
including significant (but not all) aspects of natural law theory.
In political thought, Luther is famous, even controversial, for his two
kingdoms theory, which divides the world into two kingdoms, the secular
and the spiritual, both created by God and both good. 35 7 The spiritual world
is ruled by the Gospel, the secular world by the law. Luther also distinguishes between private and public men, and allows public officials acts

351. Dov I. Frimer, The Role ofthe Lawyer in Jewish Law, 1 J. L. & RELIGION 297, 298, 301 (1983).
352. HERRING, supra note 341, at 113.

353. Id. at 114.
354. The counselor's role is different in capital cases, where all defenses are offered. Id. at 114.
355. See supra Part I.A (analyzing the standard view of legal ethics with regard to dirty hands).
356. See GERHARD EBELING, LUTHER: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS THOUGHT (R.A. Wilson trans.,
1970) (explaining that sola scriptura was the fundamental scriptural principle of the Reformation).
357. Harold J. Berman & John Witte, Jr., The Transformation of Western Legal Philosophy, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1585 (1989).
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forbidden to private individuals.3 58 Indeed, Luther's Christian prince appears to have a vocation to a specific role morality.
In all spheres, Luther opposes works righteousness (the belief that
humans earn salvation through their actions) de-emphasizes ethics, and
places faith at the heart of the Christian life.35 9 He thus opposes ethical
casuistry, which encourages works righteousness, and prefers that Christians "sin boldly" rather than vacillate in self-serving moral reckoning.3 6 °
Surely echoes of Luther reverberate in Luban's injunction to act in public
interest law and ask forgiveness. However, Luban neglects the checks and
balances that Luther provided.
On the subject of the law, Luther includes judges and lawyers in the group
that is subject to an ethic different from that of personal morality. Judges
must enforce the law, including the death penalty; such enforcement gives
them a role similar to that of politicians. Harold Berman encapsulates the
ethic: "As a public person, serving in such offices as the military, the
judiciary, or the legal profession, however, a Christian may be required to
resist his neighbor and to avenge injustice and abuse, even to the point of
violence and bloodshed."3 6 ' Luther reserves some of his usual witty commentary for the morality of lawyers:
A jurist can be a scoundrel but a theologian ought to be a godly man.
Godliness befits theologians, not lawyers.... lawyers don't give anything
to God but only to themselves.
Every lawyer is either a good-for-nothing or a know-nothing.
There's an old proverb: 'A lawyer's a bad Christian.' And it's true.3 62
In addition, Luther criticizes those who sue and are sued as weak and
immature Christians.3 63 He urged his son not to be a lawyer, but to be a
minister instead.3 6
Luther's theoretical treatment of the law differs from Thomistic natural
law theory. Luther identifies two purposes in the law. Law coerces persons
into actions they would otherwise not choose, thus bringing order to
society.36 5 Law also convicts persons of their personal sinfulness, making

358. See id. at 1592 (noting that Lutheran public officials were thought to have a special calling to
serve the community that might require adoption of a Christian social ethic distinct from a Christian
personal ethic).
359. Id. at 1581.
360. See, e.g., PAUL ALTHAUS, THE ETHICS OF MARTIN LUTHER (Robert C. Schultz trans., 1972);
PAUL ALTHAUS, THE THEOLOGY OF MARTIN LUTHER (Robert C. Schultz trans., 1966); MARTIN
LUTHER: SELECTIONS FROM HIS WRITINGS (John Dillenberger ed., 1961); EBELING, supra note 356.

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Berman & Witte, supra note 357, at 1592-93.
54 LUTHER'S WORKS 22, 150, 473-74 (Theodore G. Tappert et al. eds. & trans., 1967).
Id. at 150.
Id. at 150-51.
Berman & Witte, supra note 357, at 1609.
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them aware of their guilt, in its reminder that Christians never fully meet
the requirements of the law. 3 6 6 This less optimistic than the Thomistic
account of the law leaves one with a firm impression that Luther recognizes
and accepts the harsh realities of role morality in legal life.
However, the story does not end there. For there are nuances to Luther's
double ethic that have not yet emerged. For example, even Luther's dual
political ethic is not an account of completely separate realms; Luther is
Lutheran, but never Machiavellian. Luther's prince is never merely expedient, for his public ethic is profoundly influenced by his personal morality.
The personal life of the politician is supposed to influence and limit those
actions he would undertake in the political sphere.
A similar dual morality in the law would leave the lawyer strongly
influenced in the legal sphere by the demands of Christian love.3 67 Indeed,
the case against dual morality is even stronger in the area of law than in the
area of politics. Unlike politics, the law serves an additional theological
purpose; it convicts of sinfulness as well as coercing obedience. That dual
purpose places the law in a different category: the theological purpose of
the law may give the lawyer additional reason to be guided by personal
morality.3 6 8
Harold Berman notes that while Luther rejected many aspects of the
Thomistic tradition, "Lutheranism also taught that the Christian lawmaker
can and should do his utmost to use his reason and his will to serve God....
Politics and law were not paths to grace and faith, but grace and faith
remained paths to right politics and right law.", 3 6 9 Luther is not Luban.
The Reformation provides a lawyer who builds upon Luther's jurisprudence in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, and who provides an
additional reason to oppose a separate ethic for lawyers. 37 ° John Calvin
accepts the two Lutheran purposes of the law, but this theologian also
trained as a lawyer, adds a third, more positive interpretation.
The third use of the law is pedagogical; it teaches and encourages

366. Id. at 1610.
367. Harold J. Berman, The Influence of Christianity Upon the Development of Law, 12 OKLA. L.
REV. 86 (1959). Berman states: "[Llaw should be an instrument of justice, and a desire to convert
law and justice into instruments of Christian love." Id.
368. See id. at 98 (arguing that without the motivating power of Christianity "secular morality
becomes lukewarm, inefffectual, and hypocritical.").
369. HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 89-90
(1993).
370. III INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 18, 19 (John T. McNeill, ed. 1960). See also
DAVID LITTLE, RELIGION, ORDER, AND LAW: A STUDY IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND (1969),
and David Little, Duties of Station vs. Duties of Conscience:Are There Two Moralities?, in PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC ETHICS (D.G. Jones ed., 1978); Potter, 'The Whole Office of the Law in the Theology of
John Calvin, 3 J.L. & Rel. 117 (1985).
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Christians in the moral life.37 1 Calvin offers some middle ground between
Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther; he restores a greater role than the one
Luther gives to the natural law, although he remains more pessimistic than
Thomas about the overall possibilities of human reason and moral conduct.
Calvin sees the courts as good, for scriptural reasons: Saint Paul employed the courts of law. Calvin argues that the courts perform the work of
God, and that those who oppose the authority of the courts oppose God's
hand. 372 He advocates that the courts must be used properly; there must be
no hatred in litigation, no harm done to others, and no "relentless hounding." 37' 3 Lawsuits are permitted if they are used to promote justice and to
protect a fair claim. Calvin condemns the abuse of the courts, the "mad lust
to go to law,, 37 4 but not the courts themselves. The intention of the parties
is crucial; there must be no revenge or enmity, and even a just cause cannot
be conducted with the wrong spirit. One must treat one's opponents with
"love and good will," for "love will give every man the best counsel."37' 5
Thus, as with Luther, Calvin never abandons the law to a separate morality.
There are additional aspects of Luther's thought that oppose a dual ethic.
In their perceptive analysis of Lutheran jurisprudence, Harold Berman and
John Witte argue that the importance and originality of Lutheran jurisprudence have been long neglected.3 7 6 The genius of this jurisprudence, they
state, is its combination of rules and equity, and of natural law and
positivism, in a creative way. 37 Their point is that Lutheranism is positivist
in its approach to legal rules, but natural law-like or equitable in the
application of the rules.37 8 The emphasis within such a system is on the
conscience of the individual.37 9
Berman and Witte contrast the Lutheran two kingdoms theory with the
earlier papal two swords analysis, and argue that Luther "left law and
politics solely to political authorities."3 8 However, within the secular realm,
conscience guides the individual, and so morality does not dissociate from
law or politics. Luther's recognition of the law's purpose of coercion, and his
suspicion about human reason's capacity for moral judgment, are evident in
his acceptance of strict legal rules as a tool for social order. Berman and
371. Id.
372. Id. at IV, 20, 17.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Berman & Witte, Jr., supra note 357, at 1576.
377. Id. at 1578.
378. Id.
379. Id. (explaining that "Lutheran legal philosophy postulates the existence within every person
of a conscience, or sense of justice, which enables him or her to apply to concrete circumstances
general rules that, precisely because of their generality, are necessarily unjust.").
380. Id. at 1590.
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Witte state that Luther "emphasized that to maintain order it is important
that there be precise legal rules, not only to deter lawbreakers but also to
restrain officials, including judges, from their natural inclination to wield
their powers arbitrarily. '3 8 1 So for Luther the rules remain central to an
ethical system as they do not, for example, in either Luban's account of
public interest law, or in Simon's ethic of discretion. In a role-specific
action, according to Luther, it is important to have more, not fewer,
safeguards.
Yet the rules do not stand alone. The rules require application, and
Luther urges judges to be equitable, to apply the rules in a manner helpful
to those they serve. It is here that Berman and Witte view Luther's theory of
individual conscience as central: the "answer" the judge needs is not
provided by the scholastic tradition of right reason, but by the conscience of
the individual believer, a conscience nurtured in biblical faith. 38 2 Conscience and equity appear to operate even more forcefully for the judge
than for the politician, and so too, one might suspect, for the lawyer.
Luther's theological ethic gives further content to this idea of the
Luther's ethic has often been described as an
individual conscience.3 First,
"ethic of disposition." 83 The Christian is not preoccupied with the choice
of right actions - for here she shall surely fail - but with undertaking her
actions from a disposition of faith. Such faith gives rise to the works of love,
but the Lutheran knows these works are never perfect. Nor, above all, are
they salvific. Yet the disposition of faith must permeate the life of the
individual. In an earlier essay, Berman encapsulates how twentieth century
Protestant ethics has interpreted this idea in its ethic for the Christian Implicit in this image is a gospel of Christian legal ethics, but no full-blown
Christian philosophy of law. This gospel says to the Christian individual:
pray for God's guidance in making and keeping your contracts, in avoiding
the commission of torts, and in managing your legal affairs generally, that
in all these matters you may behave in an upright and loving manner. This
Gospel says to the Christian lawyer, judge or legislator: pray for God's
guidance in performing your official duties, so that you may act courageously in the interests of justice. But this gospel has very little to say
concretely as to what is justice, what is prohibited and what is permitted,
or what are the specific Christian aims of a system of law.3 84
Second, Luther rejects the Catholic narrowing of the notion of vocation

381. Id. at 1609.
382. Id. at 1578 (stating that Lutheran legal philosophy requires reliance on conscience for
resolution of difficult moral dilemmas).
383. See generally GEORGE WOLFGANG FORELL, FAITH AcTiVE IN LOVE 79 (1959) ("For Luther

only faith could guarantee ethical action.").
384. Berman, supra note 367, at 95.
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to the monastic or religious life and instead emphasizes the secular vocation
of Christians.38 5 God calls persons to their secular duties, in law and in
politics. Their conduct there ought always to be in response to God's call,
and so is always subject to the requirements of Christian love.386
We have seen that Luban's concern about role morality is with whether or
not certain roles or institutions can justify conduct that violates the requirements of common morality. Luther's ethic views the question from a
different angle. His concern is less with institutional excuses than with the
personal dispositions of those who serve God within institutions. As such,
his writings resonate with those philosophers whose "solution" to the
problem of dirty hands is to examine the implications of role morality for
character.
There are traces of Luther in Bernard Williams' insistence that our
professional dispositions not mar our personal dispositions.3 87 Walzer's
"reluctance," however, does not capture the complexity of the Lutheran
character.3 8 8 Simon's "ethic of discretion" has overtones of Luther's ethic of
disposition, yet Simon leaves the lawyer circumscribed within the legal
sphere, with no perspective provided from the outside and with no requirement that personal character precede the exercise of discretion.38 9 Luther
surely would acknowledge that our hands are always dirty with sin. But his
ethic is never as comfortable with sin as those writers who accept professional dirty hands.
B. A DIFFERENT CONTENT

Many Jewish and Christian writers, therefore, question the idea of a
385. See, e.g., James Luther Adams, The Vocation of the Lawyer, 31 MERCER L. REV. 531 (1979)
(stating that: "[Tihe vital interaction between law and religion (and between law and humanism)
requires of all professions an active concern beyond the call of workaday duties and also beyond the
call of career interests."); Charles L. Kammer, Vocation and the Professions, in ANN. Soc'Y OF
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 153 (Thomas W. Ogletree ed., 1981); Christopher F. Mooney, S.J., Law as
Vocation, in PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION 70 (1986) (discussing
law as vocation). The sheer burden of the lawyer's job (e.g., the firm's expectation of unending
billable hours or that lawyers will be constantly available for more work) makes it increasingly
difficult for lawyers to develop a transcendent perspective which gives meaning to their successes
and failures. Here religions, with their insistence that human work cannot provide all meaning to
human life, may encourage a concept of vocation - tailored to the needs of the profession and the
century - which will enable lawyers to step back from their work to see and respond to the world
around them.
386. Berman & Witte, supra note 357, at 1592 (noting that although no occupation could provide
a path to salvation, Lutherans considered every occupation held by a Christian a virtuous calling of
God).
387. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the issue of character with regard to dirty hands).
388. See Walzer, Dirty Hands, supra note 4, at 100 (arguing that because politicians must be
prepared to undergo punishment for their moral violations they will not break moral rules too
easily).
389. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the issue of character with regard to dirty hands).
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separate role morality for lawyers. They insist that law remain a moral
sphere. They insist that personal character is relevant to one's conduct in a
professional role, and that it must not be abandoned when one assumes that
role. In addition, they provide a further challenge: in many areas the tenets
of religious ethics challenge the content of professional, including legal,
ethics. It is no surprise that it is Alan Donagan who questions most
forcefully the content of the lawyer's ethic in the areas of confidentiality and

self-incrimination.
Sanford Levinson has addressed this question of the content of religious
and professional ethics in his analysis of the Jewish lawyer.39 ° Levinson
raises, but does not resolve, the question of the appropriate connection
between Jewish identity and the practice of law. He identifies five models of
interaction between Jewish identity and law. 391 The fifth category raises the
question of the content of the ethic. In category five Jewish commitment is a
"constitutive aspect of the practice of law." The tension within this category
is between one's religious or ethnic commitments and legal education,
which offers the "systematic denigration of whatever one had done prior to
entering law school." 39' 2
Levinson poses a number of difficult questions in this category. In the
military, what would happen if Jewish generals were stricter than the
Geneva conventions? Or if Jewish law suggested that one violate the
Geneva conventions? How does one interpret the halakhic exhortation not
to sue Jews in secular courts? Should the Jewish lawyer identify the
390. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577 (1993). See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, RABBIS AND
LAWYERS: THE JOURNEY FROM TORAH TO CONSTITUTION (1990) (exploring the relationship between
Jewish identity and American law).
391. Levinson, supra note 390, at 1583-84. The first is the "intersection of sets" approach. This
category includes persons who are both Jewish and lawyers. By. raising questions about Jewish
identity, this category raises difficult questions about who is Jewish. While this category may tell us
something about the progress of demographic groups, or about the nature of the legal profession,
Levinson states that it has limited implications for legal practice.
The second category is the expression of social and political solidarity. Some lawyers may express
loyalty to a specifically Jewish community, whether or not there is a religious element to the
identification. In this model, being Jewish is an ethnic experience, as in Justice Frankfurter's
commitment to Zionism. For example, a Jewish lawyer may refuse to work on Saturday out of ethnic
solidarity, not because of religious obligation.
In the third model, the Jewish lawyer enters the workplace, but leaves the internal norms of legal
practice untouched. Thus the lawyer may refuse to work on certain days to meet religious
obligations, but his actual practice would not be affected. This category raises the question of
whether one's legal practices themselves would be affected in any way by one's Jewish identity.
Fourth is the practitioner in Jewish courts, where the role of the lawyer is not interpreted as in the
American system. The classic picture of the American lawyer is criticized in Jewish thought; the
advocate is criticized as less interested in justice. In this tradition, there is great suspicion about the
lawyer. Since the Middle Ages, this view has been rejected, and Jews can represent clients. Id. at
1584.
392. Id. at 1601.

HeinOnline -- 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 276 1994-1995

1995]

LAWYER'S DIRTY HANDS

duty to her?
religious identity of his client, and then explain religious
393
Should the Jewish lawyer promote adherence to halakhah?
Within Levinson's analysis, the Lake Pleasant bodies case reappears.
Levinson argues that there is a division between Jewish law and American
legal ethics on questions of confidentiality. 394 While there is no clear
halakhic rule to regulate disclosure, the community interest takes precedence in Jewish law. What is clear in Jewish law is "its clear rejection of the
authority of the secular state to make the final decision about the values
involved in a given conflict between preserving the client's secrets and
disclosing them in order to protect the community., 39 5 The community
interest would favor disclosure in the Lake Pleasant bodies case. As in
Donagan's analysis, the moral weight favors disclosure.
Levinson does not conclude that the Jewish lawyer must disclose. Nor
does he conclude that the religious commitments of the lawyer must
override her professional obligations. Finally, he does not claim to resolve
the difficult question of the appropriate interaction between religious faith
and professional conduct.3 96
Even without reaching that hardest of questions, Levinson's analysis is
important for contemporary legal ethics. Given the status questionae, it is
sufficient for him to point out the existence of different moral traditions on
questions of confidentiality, responsibility to clients, and obligations to third
parties. Levinson notes that in most law schools, students with moral
questions are directed to moral philosophy, not religion. "Rarely, if ever,
does one hear suggestions that privileged guidance might be found in
religious traditions and their notions of ethical duties., 397 At a minimum,
such traditions provide the outside perspective necessary to break the
monopoly of lawyers on legal ethics.

393. One critic of Levinson's paper suggested that he include a sixth model. See Russell G.
Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a MulticulturalSociety: A Midrash on Levinson, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613
(1993) (explaining that the sixth model would involve the lawyer in commitment to Jewish values in
the practice of law, including special attention to the practice of civil rights law). Levinson is
uncomfortable with such a model because it involves one in "a delineation of what count as
specifically Jewish values." Levinson, supra note 390, at 1584.
394. Levinson, supra note 390, at 1609.
395. Id. at 1610 (explaining that "should this situation ever arise, it might well be analyzed as a
true conflict of legal obligations, rather than as a more conventional conflict between law and
morals."). On Jewish law and confidentiality, see generally Gordon Tucker, The ConfidentialityRule:
A Philosophical Perspective With Reference to Jewish Law and Ethics, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 99
(1985); Alfred S. Cohen, On MaintainingA Professional Confidence, 7 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP.
Soc'Y 73, 76 (1984) (Bar amendment requiring lawyers to keep client secrets about financial fraud
"is going to pose a great dilemma for an observant Jewish attorney who, for example, would be
legally precluded from warning a friend not to buy a share in his client's business ... [because] one
must try to prevent harm from coming upon another Jew.").
396. Levinson, supra note 390, at 1610-11.
397. Id. at 1604.
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C. A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

Philosophical ethics has played an important role in piercing legal ethics.
Yet religious ethics adds its own perspective.3 98 For example, in twentieth
century medical ethics, a religious concept with limited acceptance in the
secular world - the idea of the afterlife - had profound implications for
the human moral questions of death and dying. Because of their conviction
that physical life was not the ultimate value, religious ethicists were in the
forefront of those committed to the right of patients to refuse certain forms
of medical treatment.3 Religious ethicists have refused to identify the
medical profession as a separate moral sphere, and so have brought their
moral insights to bear on contemporary medical ethical questions in a
productive manner.
Certain religious ethicists who address professional ethics argue that a
perspective of "ultimacy" is gained from the dialogue between religion and
law.40 0 Such a perspective is not superior to the vision of the lawyer, but it is
different, and may lead lawyers to new interpretations of their conduct.
For example, Christopher Mooney observes that "lawyers precisely as
lawyers are severely limited when it comes to dealing with moral questions.
For the professionalizing of any area of knowledge tends to produce 'minds
in a groove,' to use Alfred North Whitehead's phrase, grooves that result in
a 'restraint of serious thought.' 41 Dialogue with persons of different
training - provided the dialogue respects the lawyer's description of her
own experience - may enable the lawyer to judge her professional experience in new ways.
If in law, as in other professions, specialized training circumscribes the
agent's moral vision, then religion's task is to broaden the individual's
awareness of choices and of responsibilities. If, as Ronald Green argues, the
"deep structure" of all religions includes "first, a method of moral reasoning involving 'the moral point of view'; second, a set of beliefs affirming the
reality of moral retribution; and third, a series of 'transmoral' beliefs that
suspend moral judgment and retribution when this is needed to overcome
398. Religious perspectives may be of help to secular legal ethics, but not because they are really
secular. See Mashburn, supra note 125 (arguing Reinhold Niebuhr is relevant for legal ethics
because he is really not a theologian).
399. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION
50-55 (1984).
400. For a full discussion of the perspective of the religious ethicist, see James F. Bresnahan, S.J.,
'Ethics' and the Study and Practice of Law: The Problem of Being Professionalin a Fuller Sense, 28 J.
LEG. EDUC. 189 (1976); James F. Bresnahan, S.J., Ethical Theory and ProfessionalResponsibility:
Possible Contributionsof Religious Ethics to DialogAbout ProfessionalEthics of Attorneys, 37 JURIST 56
(1977); James F. Bresnahan, S.J., A Note on Recent Literature:Religion and Law in a New Perspective,
in 11 ANN. SOC'Y OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 243-58 (Thomas W. Ogletree ed., 1981).
401. Mooney, supra note 385, at 67. See BALL, supra note 217, at 96 (arguing that: "[wlhat is
taught under the rubric of ethics seems to me a gross distortion.").
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paralysis and despair, 4 0 2 then the perspective of ultimacy may illuminate
difficult moral choices as well as motivate persons to choose what is moral.
Religions must be very complex systems if they are to meet such complicated and even contradictory human needs, Green concludes, and the way
in which
they do so captures much of the paradox of the human moral
403
life.
The perspective of religion may not really be "ultimate." But at a
minimum it is different from the mindset of legal ethics, and so offers some
new perspective on an ethic that is too closed. From both Jewish and
Christian authors, I have argued, emerge convictions about the law which
question the concept of a separate role morality for lawyers. Moreover, the
content of these ethical traditions challenges the conclusions of legal ethics.
For example, in my opinion, the bar's self-interested conception of
confidentiality fails to meet the challenge of Jewish and Christian accounts
of confidentiality. These religious traditions do not end the moral discussion
within the attorney-client nexus, but instead include broader social interests, especially the interests of the harmed "third party," in their ethical
analysis. That perspective should be represented in the committees that
draft and enforce bar regulations.
Many lawyers and philosophers greet the conclusions of religious traditions with indifference. The insights of one religious tradition are often
insignificant to persons raised in another religious tradition, or to persons
indifferent or hostile to all religious traditions. To lawyers in particular,
linkages between legal ethics and religion may appear tenuous. Religion
plays a small role in law school curricula, and when it appears on stage, it is
usually in the guise of the Establishment Clause. The constitutional fear of
entanglement overhangs the discussion, and prevents any critical analysis of
religion itself as a field of study.
The burden of proof is at present on those who argue that figures like
Maimonides and Martin Luther are relevant to contemporary discussions of
legal ethics. One argument on their behalf is that in religion - unlike, for
example, the history of philosophy - the traditions offer insight precisely
because they arise from the historical experience of actual communities and
individuals.
The history of Protestant and Roman Catholic ethics, for example, has
402. RONALD M. GREEN, RELIGION AND MORAL REASON 3 (1988). "They point their adherents to
the method of moral reasoning. They try to assure them that governing one's life by this method is
not ultimately self-destructive, that the righteous are rewarded. And, in response to the kind of
self-condemnation that inevitably accompanies sensitive moral striving, they are prepared to ease
their insistence on judgment and retribution by holding out the promise of a redemption not based
entirely on one's deeds." Id.
403. Id. at 3-4. Green states: "[Alnyone unwilling to tolerate complexity should not undertake the
study of religious belief."
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provided a valuable resource for contemporary ethical theory. James Gustafson has demonstrated that, at its best, Roman Catholic thought offered a
supple casuistry, which was able to confront complicated moral questions
with intellectual rigor and with concrete suggestions for conduct.4 °4 Yet in
practice it often ossified, becoming a rigid system which excluded individual
circumstances and subjective judgment. On the other hand, Protestant
ethics exalted the conscience of the individual believer and gave voice to the
moral freedom of the individual, in her ability to transcend her works. Yet it
was often formless, failing to provide any clear guidance to those in moral
perplexity.4 °5
In the twentieth century, ecumenism led members of both groups to
recognize the strengths of the other's perspective. Many religious ethicists
turned to explore the middle ground between traditions: they learned to
incorporate both rules and disposition, both moral norms and individual
freedom, into their work. Lawyers who take sides in the ongoing model
codes versus personal character debates in legal ethics might begin to
recognize that they are reinventing the wheel." 6
Moreover, the history of religions is a history of social institutions as well
as doctrines. The history of religions is full of examples of the abuse of
moral authority by those in power. Religions have been oppressors as well
as defenders of the oppressed, and have always needed prophetic voices to
recall the community to its basic moral purpose. Religions have sinned by
fostering closed moral systems which shut out moral insight. In the profession of the ministry, for example, confidentiality has at times protected the
priest at the expense of others in the community. Religion has yielded pride
of place in our society to law, but there is still good reason for law to learn
the lessons of its history.
Theodore Schneyer has dismissed some philosophical critiques of legal
ethics with the following words: "In other words, only when the legal
profession abandons its ethical canon or orthodoxy in favor of a priesthood
404.

M. GUSTAFSON, PROTESTANT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC ETHICS: PROSPECTS FOR RAP46-59 (1978).
405. See id. at 33-46.
406. Id. at 144-46. Gustafson concludes that despite twentieth century moves toward rapprochement between the Protestant and Roman Catholic traditions, persons of different religious
backgrounds may still find that they agree about specific conclusions for ethical questions, but not
about the theoretical foundations upon which those conclusions are based. Id. at 157-58.
Many participants in the development of American medical ethics discovered such a process at
work. Something similar occurs in this analysis of religious arguments about the morality of the
lawyer. Jewish and Roman Catholic approaches come to similar common morality conclusions,
without sharing fundamental presuppositions about the nature of God's creation or of God's
providence or revelation. Some Protestant authors are similarly suspicious about a separate
morality for lawyers, but their theological presuppositions about the law, morality, and human
capacities for reasoning and for righteousness, vary enormously from other Christian and Jewish
authors.
JAMES

PROCHEMENT
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of all believers can lawyers be restored to a state of grace." 40

7

With Walzer,

Freedman, Luban, and many others, Schneyer may prefer that lawyers
remain in their own state with dirty hands. But in the history of theology, the
state of grace is better than the state of sin. The individual's job is to resist
the temptation to sin and not grant it the status of a defeasible presumption.
A priesthood of all believers which holds everyone to fundamental moral
principles would be an improvement over the current legal magisterium.
VI. CONCLUSION

We began with dirty hands. They are indeed pervasive in legal and
political ethics. Their meaning is ambiguous. In one sense, they are inevitable in a profession that struggles with complex moral dilemmas. In such a
sense the presence of dirty hands is incontrovertible. The metaphor reminds
us of human weakness, of imperfection, of finitude. Dirty hands express our
sense that the moral life is complicated. Some Christian writers might call
that sin. The dirty hands metaphor is valuable insofar as it reminds us of
moral complexity and insofar as it helps to analyze difficult choices.
Other interpretations of dirty hands, however, should be rejected. In
legal ethics, dirty hands seeks to justify conduct that should not be justified.
In the name of dirty hands, outside perspectives - perspectives that might
in fact illuminate moral decision-making - are excluded from discussion.
In this Article, I have opposed two alternative accounts of dirty hands. In
the first, professional conduct may obligate one to the violation of common
morality. In the second, the separate morality of the profession justifies
departures from common morality.
I have argued that these dirty hands should be combatted, not accepted.
The activities of the legal profession should be assessed by common moral
principles. Non-lawyers should be involved in the construction of the
profession's moral codes, as well as in their enforcement. The ethical
analysis of the profession should not stop with the attorney-client relationship, but should consider the broader moral and social dimensions of the
attorney's conduct.
I have also argued that the Jewish and Christian traditions contribute a
deep distrust of separate conduct for lawyers to the discussion. In addition,
they urge that moral rules and personal character are not exclusive categories, but must be integrated in each moral agent. Their history as well as
their doctrine remind us of the ease with which power is abused. They
remind us to strive for clean hands.

407. Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's StandardMisconception, supra note 14, at 1538.
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